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INTRODUCTION
“The full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and
the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms
with men in all fields” .
(UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979)
Understanding the contribution that women make in rural economies
is essential: in fact, their contribution to growth and poverty reduction is
particularly important when investigating the agricultural economies of all
developing countries. According to Stamp (1989), “in development discourse,
women are no longer entirely invisible, even if they still get far from equal
time”. Indeed, including gender issues in agricultural research is being widely
recognized as an essential step towards the understanding of rural development.
As a result, adding the gender variable for analyzing farm-related issues is the
response to the assumption that : “Yes, gender makes a difference” (Poats,
1991). We argue that paying attention to gender is a matter of development:
as will be highlighted many times within the thesis, women’s involvement
in the productive activities is overwhelming. In fact, it extends from the
production of food crops, tending animals, crop harvesting, to collecting fuel
and firewood, child and elderly care, food processing and preparation. For these
multiple reasons, women can be considered as the engine of the household,
whose livelihoods and well-being highly depend on them. However, many of
these activities are not considered as “economically active employment” (FAO,
2011) in national accounts. Additionally, as FAO (2011) stated: “Agriculture
is underperforming in many developing countries for a number of reasons.
[...] women lack of resources and opportunities they need to make the most
productive use of their time.”
Moreover, it is important to shed light on the confusion on the use of the
words sex and gender: in fact, while “sex differences refer to innate biological
differences between men and women” (Quisumbing, 1996), gender is a social
construct on which relationships between men and women are often placed.
Despite gender roles vary between and within countries and regions, depending
on the socio-economic and cultural formal and informal rules, overall women
face many constraints, both in terms of access and control over productive
resources, constructed by societal norms that rigidly embrace male dominance
(Nkhonjera, 2011). Therefore, this involves them in a vicious cycle of poverty.
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Moreover, they are subjected to a high vulnerability: even if they are the
main producers of food and responsible of the household management, they are
often marginalised both within the household itself and at the community level.
On this purpose Lawanson (2008) confirms the idea of women as second-class
citizens, with the only duty of reproduction, notwithstanding their crucial role
in productive tasks.
In recent years, the need to reduce gender inequalities has received much
attention from the international community. Since the 1975 World Conference
on Women, organized by the United Nations, many have been the attempts to
establish concrete measures to insert into the global agenda. In this regard, the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979) pointed out that “State Parties shall take all the appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas” (CEDAW, 1979; Crowley,
1999). Additionally, through the Beijing Declaration (1995), the women’s
empowerment and gender equality have been recognized as relevant issues in
the international agenda, enough to being part of the Millennium Development
Goals. Furthermore, since Boserup’s The role of women in economic development
(1970), the literature growingly advocates the socio-economic contribution that
women offer in both developed and developing economies. Also the Women’s
Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), developed by the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) represents a technical attempt to
measure women’s empowerment, due to the recognized connection among it,
food security and agricultural and economic growth.
This research project is an attempt to produce an evidence-based study on
the gender gap in low income countries, namely Nepal and Uganda. More
specifically, we will try to show why it is important to include gender issues in
the agricultural and development analyses, and why it is necessary to recognize
the essential role women play in enhancing the economic growth of low-income
countries such as those considered in the present analysis.
Structure of the Thesis
Although addressing different research paths, the three papers that compose
the thesis have the same topic in the background: women’s empowerment as
the most relevant strategy to empower the economy of developing countries.
The papers contribute to the gender debate in development economics, through
the assessment of three issues that have received particular attention by the
related literature:
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• How much does land titling enhance female decision-making power?
• Is there a gender effect of food price change on labour supply?
• Is there a gender dimension in agricultural productivity?
In Paper 1 “Does land titling promote women’s empowerment? Evidence
for Nepal” the central aim is the assessment of whether land titling could
enhance the decision-making power of Nepalese women. Indeed, land is one
of the relevant means that determine the economic well-being of peasants, as
well as an individual measure of social status (Roy and Tisdell, 2002; Kumar
and Quisumbing, 2012). However, frequently women in low-income countries
suffer from the exclusion from its access and control. Also in the case of Nepal,
although the Muluki Ain (2002) extended partially the land inheritance right to
them, female ownership rules are not offered overall, and women are formally
marginalised within the economic sector, in spite of their active involvement in
many agricultural tasks.
The research question explored in this paper is thus the following:
• Does land ownership represent an essential condition in reinforcing female
farmers’ role within their respective households?
In Paper 2, “Is time allocation gender sensitive to food price changes? An
investigation of male and female labour supply in Uganda” the potential impact
of the food price instability on the labour supply side is investigated. More
specifically, we control for the presence of a gender dimension in labour coping
strategies. Hence, in this work multiple research questions are sought to being
explored:
• To what extent food price instability influences labour supply of both men
and women?
• Are women more shock-absorbers than men?
Finally, in Paper 3, “Agricultural productivity in Uganda: does gender matter?”
the analysis is focused on the gender differences in agricultural productivity,
using the sex of the plot manager as gender indicator. In fact, as it is emphasized
in various parts of the study, land is the major means of agricultural production,
and women are often excluded not only from its ownership, but also from
its access and management. On this purpose, since land titling alone is not
sufficient to increase agricultural productivity, we will take into consideration
the three aspects of ownership, access, and management simultaneously.
In this study, the main research questions addressed are:
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• Is there empirical evidence of gender differentials in agricultural produc-
tivity?
• Is sex of the land manager a potential determinant of the gender gaps in
crop production?
Data and Methodology
Since women’s empowerment is dealt from different perspectives, different
empirical strategies have been implemented. In the first article, we draw data
from the Women’s Questionnaire of the Nepal Demographic Household Sur-
vey (DHS, 2011). DHS contains detailed data on land and farm ownership
and management. According on research purpose, we have investigated
the relationship between land entitlement and the decision-making power of
female farmers implementing three different approaches, depending on the
empowerment measure used: an OLS, an Ordered Logit and a Logit models.
In both the second and the third paper data are drawn from the Uganda Na-
tional Panel Survey, a nationally representative program implemented through
the technical and financial support of the World Bank Living Standard Mea-
surement Study - Integrated Survey on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). Whilst in
the second paper we use data from the three panel waves (2009-10; 2010-11;
2011-12), in the third one we have employed only the first two waves (2009-10;
2010-11). In the second paper we have based our analysis on the Household
Questionnaire, that collects data both at the household and the individual level.
However, in order to control for the net market position of farm households, that
informs us on whether households were net buyers or net sellers, we combine the
dataset with some sections of the Agricultural Questionnaire, where information
on food quantities sold and harvested are contained. The analysis has been
performed using an Hybrid Tobit model (Neuhaus and Kalbfleish, 1998; Allison,
2005). In the third paper instead the analysis has been carried out using
mainly the Agricultural Questionnaire, where specific information on the plot
management are contained. However, as data are at the household level, in order
to extrapolate data on gender, we need to take into consideration some sections
of the Household Questionnaire. To estimate the potential gender differences
in agricultural productivity, a Tobit fixed-effects model, firstly introduced by
Honore´ (1992), has been implemented.
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Main Findings
The analysis carried out in the first paper represents an important contribution
to the literature about the women’s empowerment in agriculture, focusing on
the role land titling could exert in enhancing the decision-making power of
Nepalese female farmers. As we expected, land ownership is an effective source
of empowerment. This result is robustly confirmed by the fact that, contrariwise,
women who do not own land and do not work on the household farm assist to a
decrease of their decisional power.
As concerns the second paper, our results support the hypothesis that women
are the real “shock absorbers” when exogeneous events, like food price changes,
occur: in fact, we have found that annual paid hours increase for both men and
women, although the magnitude of the female coefficient is higher. This may
be due to the role of women as food suppliers for the household components,
particularly children and the elderly: in fact, the higher the food price, the
higher should be the remunerated hours needed to guarantee the same food
intake to household members. However, the hours devoted to the other labour
time categories (non market, domestic and agricultural ones) reduce.
Results from the third paper are consistent with the previous findings of the
related literature: plot managed by women are less productive than plots
managed by men. However, due to the limits of the data, we can only talk
about partial gender differences in agricultural productivity, as we cannot control
for gaps in inputs access, such as fertilizers, training services, machineries, and
so on, that with no doubt have a great influence on the agricultural productivity.
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CHAPTER 1
Does land titling promote
women’s empowerment?
Evidence for Nepal.
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Abstract
Women’s land titling is recognized as an important tool to promote women’s
empowerment in agriculture, as well as a means to fight poverty. However,
most rural women still have low access to land, despite their crucial role in
the agricultural sector. This paper uses the National Demographic and Health
Survey (2011) to investigate the role female land rights have in promoting their
empowerment - expressed in terms of decision-making power - in Nepal. Our
results demonstrate that women’s final say within the household increases with
land ownership.
Keywords: land property rights, Nepal, empowerment, gender
JEL codes: D13, J16, Q15.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the dominant and important role that women play in the agricultural
sector, many are the constraints to their full involvement in the socio-economic
scenario entrapping them in a vicious cycle of poverty. In fact, women face
many forms of inequality, both in terms of access and control over productive
resources, constructed by societal norms that rigidly embrace male dominance
(Nkhonjera, 2011). Systematic differences in land tenure regimes between men
and women contribute to the radicalization of inequality and poverty for women
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2009). They are subjected to vulnerability: even if they are
the main producers of food and responsible of the household management, at the
same time they neither benefit of an actual decisional power within the house-
hold itself, nor of land rights. As FAO (2011) pointed out, in many countries
of the Sub-Saharan Africa the agricultural production could increase if women
would have the same possibilities of access to productive resources. Meanwhile,
the 1979 FAO report of the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Ru-
ral Development supported the idea of ensuring women’s equitable access to
land and other productive resources (FAO, 1979). This notwithstanding, a sub-
stantial assets gap between women and men persists. The Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) states in Ar-
ticle 14 that “State Parties shall take all the appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas, [...], and to have access to [...] and
equal treatment in land and agrarian reform” (CEDAW, 1979; Crowley, 1999).
Similarly, the Strategic Objective A.2 of the Beijing Declaration (1995) reflects
this concern: in particular, it defines the legislative and administrative frame-
work aimed at guaranteeing and enshrining the ownership and inheritance rights
to women. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, namely the Third Mil-
lennium Development Goal, as well as the World Bank (IBRD/World Bank,
2009), even recognize the achievement of gender equality and women’s empow-
erment as being essential.
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the role of land prop-
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erty rights in promoting women’s empowerment, emphasizing the central role
that they would have to fight poverty. As Mutangadura (2006) states, “the
traditional exclusion of women from property and land ownership is the most
damaging global human rights violation experienced in many developing coun-
tries”. Also Kachika (2009) noted that poverty reduction and the achievement
of Millennium Development Goals cannot take place without a whole access and
control over land.
The aim of this paper is therefore to contribute to the analysis of empowerment
of women working in agriculture. The specific question addressed in this study
is whether land titling can enhance working women’s empowerment by increas-
ing their decision-making power within the household. Previous studies have
used the level of education as proxy of women’s degree of empowerment. We
build, instead, an indicator of women’s decision power within the households as
a proxy of empowerment, since we believe that empowerment is a multifaceted
concept, that may be approximated by several types of measures. This topic
has been previously explored by Allendorf (2007), whose results show a signifi-
cant relationship between women’s land rights and their decisional power within
the household. This study reinforces this evidence, showing that female land
ownership is a necessary condition for ensuring women’s empowerment in agri-
culture, so that lack of ownership and access to land constitutes a fatal barrier
to women’s empowerment.
As in the study by Allendorf, we focus on Nepal. Differently from the empow-
erment scale adopted by Allendorf, we introduce a new measure of empower-
ment that is more precise in accounting for the variability of female decision-
making power within the household. We draw our sample from Demographic
and Health Survey (2011), which contains information on both female decision-
making power and asset ownership at the individual level. One limit of our
analysis is represented by the potential endogeneity of land ownership, accord-
ing to which more empowerment could increase the probability of owning land.
This problem is not easy to overcome, due to the difficulty to identify a robust
instrumental variable in the dataset we use, and to the absence of panel data
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that would allow us to take account of unobserved heterogeneity by means of
fixed effects. It must be said, however, that the fact that women in develop-
ing countries become land owners mostly through inheritance (Deere and Doss,
2006; RDI, 2009; Kumar and Quisumbing, 2012), might support the hypothesis
of exogeneity of land ownership.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we lay out the theoretical dimen-
sion of land property rights by emphasizing the gender-bias in their assignment.
In Section 3, we give a brief description of the Nepalese female farmers’ property
status. In Section 4 we present the data, focusing in particular on the two vari-
ables whose association we want to investigate (namely empowerment and land
property rights). In Section 5 we describe our methodological approach. We
present the findings of our research in Section 6 and in Section 7 we conclude.
2. WOMEN AND LAND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Land is an important asset that determines the economic well-being of peas-
ants, and granting ownership rights is fundamental for the sustainable devel-
opment of agriculture (Roy and Tisdell, 2002). Furthermore, it is considered a
fundamental mean to escape poverty and to ensure the household’s food security
(Pena et al., 2008), as well as a measure of social status. In many developing
countries, land remains unequally distributed in favour of male heads of the
household, undermining women’s opportunity to exert any form of control over
it (Nightingale, 2006). Land could create a sense of self-worth and provide
physical safety and psychological security (RDI, 2009). Ensuring land rights
to women could thus reduce the gender inequalities and dependence on men
for their survival, but formal discrimination still persist (Rao, 2005). As Ja-
cobs (2004) pointed out, land is a symbol of patrilineage continuity and of male
authority, so that women’s land rights are still largely discriminated against
(Mutangadura, 2004). Existing research evidences that strengthening women’s
economic and legal rights has a real and positive impact on women’s labour force
participation, investment and agricultural productivity (Hallward-Driemeier et
al., 2013; Pena et al., 2008; Goldstein and Udry, 2005; Yngstrom, 2002). Ku-
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mar and Quisumbing (2012), for example, point out the positive implications of
women assets in terms of increased investments in the next generation’s health,
nutrition and schooling, stressing the long term benefits in terms of women’s
well-being. In Zimbabwe, for example, only widowed and divorced women with
custody of children could be granted land, even if the share is less than that
one granted to men (Gaidzanwa, 1994). Instead Peterman et al. (2010) argue
that women, particularly widows, in sub-Saharan Africa are victims of an asset
disinheritance, which could be considered as a form of gender-based violence
(Izumi, 2007). Contrariwise, in Malawi the inheritance land laws have been
revised, recognizing equal opportunities to inherit land regardless the gender
belonging (Nkhonjera, 2011), notwithstanding the reluctance of the customary
land regulation. Also the World Development Report 2014 states that “laws in
most of the world allow women to own assets, but several countries, particu-
larly in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, still have gender-specific ownership
rights that limit women’s ability to acquire, sell, transfer, or inherit property”
(World Bank, 2014). Following Agarwal (2003) the three sources of arable land
- namely the State, the family and the market – typically allocate land to male
households’ heads. In other words, the three forms of distribution are gender-
biased. This is even confirmed by Kevane and Gray (1999) who, evoking the
Sub-Saharan women’s condition, report that they are “owners of crop” instead
of “owners of land”. A study about land management in China (Hare et al.,
2008) stated that recognizing land titling to women reduces the probability of
the household to fall into poverty, and this is also validated by the purpose of
the third Millennium Development Goal1.
This property structure has implications for women’s decision-making both
intra-households and within the community. Control over land is a key domain
1There are many studies (Udry et al., 1995; Quisumbing, 1995; Edriss, 2005; Goldstein
and Udry, 2005; Peterman et al., 2010; Rahman, 2010; Kilic et al., 2013) that stress on the
positive role of female farmers for the agricultural productivity (e.g. groundnuts in Malawi).
Additionally, several studies have found that redistributing inputs between men and women
in the household increases the allocation of resources to food (Hoddinot and Haddad, 1995;
Duflo and Udry, 2004).
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for exercising choice, especially in agriculture where, as emphasized by a large
part of the studies, men own most of the assets and exercise most of the deci-
sion power. In this vein, legal property rights could be positive for women, since
they would change their bargaining power within their households. As noted
by Duflo (2012), in fact, the decision-making sphere is still “monopolized” by
men, due to the widespread cultural barriers that women face2. Agarwal (1994)
outlines how, in the rural context, the bargaining power has a bidirectional re-
lationship with land entitlement: in fact, while the weakness of the bargaining
power can reduce the access to production inputs, at the same time the lack of
property rights can reduce the capability/possibility of bargaining, reinforcing
the social and economic insecurity.
3. CASE STUDY
Nepal is an economy based on agriculture, with about 80 percent of the
economically active labour force engaged in the agricultural activities (Bhan-
dari, 2004). In this country farm and agricultural wage are the income sources
for most of the population. Land represents a crucial source of economic liveli-
hoods, with rural households more likely to own land than the urban ones (DHS,
2011). As Bhandari asserts, “Land is more than a physical entity; it has been,
and continues to be, the economic backbone of the agrarian system and the rural
power structure” (Allendorf, 2007). Women play an important role in farming
activities. They participate to different agricultural activities, as plowing, ir-
rigation, harvesting. Some studies about female farm workers in South Asia
(Rahman, 2010; Hasnah et al., 2004) show that female labour is as productive
as the male one. Nonetheless, they are often discriminated with respect to men:
as the World Bank (2014) argues, “women farmers frequently have lower access
than men to agricultural extension and advisory services, often due in part to
biased membership rules or requirements” and are treated as invisible farmers
2She finds that these barriers are not a prerogative of developing countries, as they persist
in the developed world: according to a series of experiments, women leaders are evaluated
more negatively than male leaders.
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(Ovwigho and Ifie, 2014). Despite their active role into the agricultural pro-
duction, women do not fully share its benefits, as they are not recognized full
property rights of land. As in other Southern Asian countries, inheritance is
the most usual way to grant women’s property rights (RDI, 2009). The Muluki
Ain (Eleventh Amendment) of the Country Code of Nepal (2002) introduced
some progress in this field: daughters who have inherited ancestral property
must return their share to their heirs (brothers) in case of marriage, but this
restriction does not apply to land jointly purchased by the married couple. At
the same time, widows inherit from deceased husbands. While generally land
is owned by men, the Demographic and Health Survey (2011) highlights that
almost the 10 percent of Nepalese women own land. As Allendorf (2007) points
out, this could depend on more egalitarian inheritance practices that have taken
place in the country: as the author suggests, some parents decide to give land
to daughters because they have not sons, they have plenty of land or for other
reasons. Additionally - she affirms - urban women who have other sources of
income could decide to buy land. Moreover, even if the Interim Constitution
(2007) provides equal access to land through inheritance, purchase, leaseholds
and government land allocations, informally women are still discriminated from
land titling. In 2013, the Second National Conference of Farmer Women em-
phasized the need to ensure equal land rights to female farmers, helping to
increase the understanding on the importance of making land ownership less
gender-biased.
4. DATA
The data used in the present study are drawn from the 2011 Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS), a nationally representative cross-sectional household
survey. It is structured in four core questionnaires (Household, Women, Men
and Children), of which we use only the Women one, according to the aims of
the paper previously mentioned. A total of 12.674 eligible women were surveyed
(age between 15 and 49), from whom we draw our sample of 3600 women. As
we are interested in women’s empowerment in agriculture, we have selected
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only women employed in the agricultural sector, who are currently married
and reside with their husbands or partners. In this way, we have discarded
female headed households where women would be the primary decision makers
by default (mostly widowed women). In this section we describe the variables
supposed to be related to the empowerment of Nepalese women in agriculture,
with a special focus on land property rights. On this purpose we have built
proxies for both empowerment and land ownership.
4.1. Empowerment
Empowerment is a multifunctional concept, which embraces different aspects
of both individual and collective life. As it is a subjective notion, depending on
own life experiences, personality and aspirations (Alkire et al., 2012), a unique
definition of empowerment cannot be provided. Kabeer (1999) defines empow-
erment as the process by which people acquire the ability to make choices. In
other words, it is a dynamic process of change. Similarly, Alsop et al. (2006)
argues for an explanation of empowerment as “the process of enhancing an in-
dividual’s or group’s capacity to make purposive choices and to transform those
choices into desired actions and outcomes”. Instead Narayan (2002) proposes
a definition of empowerment in terms of “expansion of assets and capabilities
of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold
accountable institutions that affect their lives”. Women’s empowerment and
economic development are closely related: as Duflo (2012) highlights, a bidi-
rectional relationship exists as, while on the one side some constituents of de-
velopment, as health, education, political participation and rights, could bring
down gender inequalities, on the other side the persistence of the mentioned
inequalities delays development. Assets at which women have access have a
paramount significance in terms of empowerment, and could increase their bar-
gaining power. In this vein, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) argue that the
bargaining power within a household is determined, among various factors, by
control over resources. Particularly, female land ownership could influence the
bargaining power within a household. Meanwhile, according to Datta (2008)
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ownership of resources (e.g. land) “does not automatically imply an increased
ability to act according to one’s preferences”. Based on this way, the policy ac-
tions for land property rights represent a crucial step for their empowerment, by
raising their decision-making and autonomy at household, community and na-
tional level. Finally, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI),
developed by IFPRI, gives an important and innovative contribution in this
field: it is a multidimensional index, which measures the degree of women’s
empowerment within five domains (1. decisions about agricultural production,
2. access to and decision making power over productive resources, 3. control
over use of income, 4. leadership in the community, and 5. time allocation).
4.1.1. Empowerment Measures
The empowerment measures we have constructed are based on four decision
domains available in the dataset we used. Respondents were asked who in
their household decides (1) on how to spend money derived from husband’s
earnings, (2) on respondent’s health care, (3) on major household purchases,
and (4) on visits to family or relatives. Then we categorized the answers in four
options: decisions taken alone by the women interviewed, decisions taken jointly
with their husband/partner, decisions taken only by their husband/partner and
decisions taken by someone else. The vast majority of decisions were made
jointly with their partners, even if few of them (particularly those concerning
health, large purchases and visits), were taken by someone else3.
Hence we created three empowerment measures. Differently from Allendorf
(2007) we have created a first measure of empowerment (final say) to compare
women who have final say alone on at least one of the four decisions with those
who made all the four decisions jointly with their partners or who have no
decisional power on all domains. This is a binary variable that assumes the
value of one if she has the final say on at least one of the four decisions, and
3Actually, women were also asked who usually decided to spend the respondent’s earnings,
but we could not use it due to the low number of observations with respect to the other
decisional domains (356).
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zero otherwise. As reported in Table 2 below, we can observe that most of
the women of our sample makes decisions jointly with their partners/husbands,
or have not any decisional power (almost 69 percent). Subsequently, to better
exploit the information on the variability of women’s decision power available
in the data, we have constructed a discrete measure of empowerment, empscore,
summing up the score variables created for each decisional domain, each ranging
from 1 to 4, where score 1 is attributed when decisions are taken by someone
else, 2 when decisions are taken by the husband only, 3 when decisions are taken
jointly with their partner and 4 if they decide alone. Empscore ranges from 4 to
16. Higher scores indicate a higher level of empowerment, and vice versa. Table
2 shows that only a little percentage of women are able to make decisions alone,
while most of them have no decision power, or anyway decisions are taken jointly
with their partners. The third measure of empowerment we have employed in
our analysis, is derived by grouping the empscore values, so that 1 identifies the
lowest, 2 a middle-low, 3 a middle-high and 4 the highest level of empowerment
(in detail: 1 represents the values of empscore between 4 and 7; values among 8
and 10 are encoded in group 2; 3 groups values between 11 and 13, and finally
4 corresponds to values ranging between 14 and 16). The Cronbach’s alpha of
0.84, measuring the internal reliability of this empowerment scale, demonstrates
that the grouping of the four decisions into the empowerment scale is consistent.
As Table 2 shows, again decisions are made mainly by other people (someone
else or the husbands/partners), or at least by women together with their own
husbands/partners, and only 8 percent of them has the power to make decisions
alone.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the three empowerment measures.
Variable Nb of obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Final say 3600 0.31 0.46 0 1
Empscore 3600 8.98 3.57 4 16
Empowerment scale 3600 2.11 0.99 1 4
Source: Author’s calculation using Nepal DHS (2011).
Table 2: Distribution of the three empowerment measures.
Variable Absolute Frequencies Percentage Frequencies
Final Say
0 2477 68.81
1 1123 31.19
Empscore
4 772 21.44
6 390 10.83
7 165 4.58
8 341 9.47
10 366 10.17
11 151 4.19
12 740 20.56
13 253 7.03
14 110 3.06
15 82 2.28
16 96 2.67
Empowerment Scale
1 1327 36.86
2 841 23.36
3 1144 31.78
4 288 8.00
Source: Author’s calculation using Nepal DHS (2011).
4.2. Land Property Rights
In the Demographic and Health Survey - Women Questionnaire, women had
to answer to the following question: “Do you own any land alone or jointly?”.
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From these data, we have found that the vast majority of them (more than
90% of the selected sample) did not have any land. Following Allendorf (2007),
we created a measure of land ownership, which combines information about
land ownership with information about women’s working condition (i.e working
as contributing family members, as self-employed or as employees). In fact,
taking into consideration only information about land ownership could lead to
some bias: even if our aim is to understand the role of women’s land titling
in enhancing their empowerment, in any case considering women who do not
own land but work in the family land is different from treating women neither
possess any land nor work in the family farm. Given these considerations, hence
we created three categories of land titling:
• lives in landless household : women who do not own land and work for
someone else;
• lives in landed household : women who have not any land titling, but work
in the family land;
• land owners: women who own land themselves and are self-employed.
Below (Table 3) we have reported the cross-tabulation showing the percentage
of women having the final say on household’s decisions, on the basis of the
women’s land ownership.
Table 3: Percentage of women having the final say on household’s
decisions, depending on land ownership.
Has final say
on at least
one decision alone or
jointly (%)
Has final say on
all the decisions
alone or
jointly (%)
Has final say on
all decisions
alone (%)
Lives in landed household 76 19 28.8
Owns land herself 94 31.1 44.5
Lives in landless household 83.2 21.3 36.9
Source: Author’s calculation using Nepal DHS (2011).
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It shows that, in general, women who own land themselves are those ones
who have a higher decision-making power. In particular, as can be seen, there is
a preponderance of female landowners who have final say in almost one decision
alone or jointly (94%), even if it can be stated that also the share of female
landowners who have final say alone is high enough (44.5)4. In general, looking
for the data, it can be observed that the higher share of women take almost one
decision alone or jointly (even in this case the percentage could be “biased’ by
the fact that most of the decisions are taken jointly). Farther, we can observe
that living in landless households seems to be related to a higher decisional
power of women working in agriculture with respect to those who live in landed
households. However, this statement is not supported by the regression results
when controlling for the other explanatory variables taken into consideration
within the analysis. In the following section we give a brief explanation of the
methodology we adopted.
5. METHODOLOGY
As we have three different women’s empowerment measures (see Table 1
above), we had to take on three approaches, one for each dependent variable.
Thereafter, we first apply a Logit Regression Model, where the dependent vari-
able is identified by the dummy final say :
Final Say = F (β0 + β1FemaleLandT itling + βkOtherIndV ar) =
1
1 + e(βo+β1FemaleLandTitling+βkOtherIndV ar
(1)
As in the other models, the independent variables chosen concerned both
women’s characteristics (age, level of education, caste ethnicity, religion, type
4Percentages are computed as the ratio of women who take decisions divided by the total
number of women for each land titling category, and then multiplied by 100: e.g. 299 is the
total number of women who own land themselves, and of them 133 make all the decisions
alone. Therefore we have: 133/299 = 0.445*100 = 44.5. The same reasoning applies for the
other land titling and decisional categories reported in the Table 3 above.
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of earnings) as well as their land entitlement. In this approach, as well as in
the Ordered Logit model we will discuss on after, the independent variables
are supposed to increase or decrease the probability of women to have final say
within the household. Whereupon we adopt an Ordered Logit Regression Model,
which is the most appropriate approach for ordinal dependent variables - in this
case the scale of empowerment (defined empowerment):
Empowerment = F (β0 + β1FemaleLandT itling + βkOtherIndV ar) =
1
1 + e(βo+β1FemaleLandTitling+βkOtherIndV ar
(2)
Finally we use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach, with the measure
of empowerment variability used as dependent variable:
Empowerment Variability = F (β0 + β1FemaleLandT itling + βkOtherIndV ar) + ε
(3)
In the results of both the ordered logit and logit models, we report the odds
ratios (OR henceforth)5. Specifically, results can be explained in terms of per-
centage variation:
∆% = 100 ∗ [OR− 1] (4)
After having given a brief explanation of the analytical procedures implemented
and on the principal issues behind this choice, in the next section we will present
some of the findings.
6. RESULTS
The descriptive statistics concerning the independent variables adopted in
the analysis are set out in Table 4. It is apparent that most of the women of
5The OR is the ratio of the probability that an event takes place for individuals exposed
to the event itself divided by the same probability for unexposed individuals.
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the sample are young wives, with an average age of 33 years. As many of them
are unpaid - and this could be related to the lack or low bargaining power that,
at the same time, could be due also to the fact they are mostly uneducated -
the household’s wealth is mainly middle/lowest.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the models.
Variable Nb of observations: 3600 women empowerment sample (%)
Land rights
Lives in landless household 9.8
Owns land herself 8.31
Lives in landed household (Ref.) 79.6
Urban residence 13.44
Caste ethnicity
High Caste 41.6
Tibeto-Burman 38.2
Other (Ref.) 20.2
Household wealth
Richest 6.5
Richer 14.5
Middle 21.7
Poorer 25.4
Poorest (Ref.) 32
Wife of the household head 74.4
Age mn: 33.5 sd: 9
Employment remuneration
Paid in cash 4.6
Paid in kind 7.58
Paid both in kind and in cash 5.31
Unpaid (Ref.) 82.5
Education
Women’s education
Primary 17.2
Secondary or more 18.5
None (Ref.) 64.3
Husband’s education
None or unknown 26.56
Primary 28.8
Secondary 37.7
Higher 7
Source: Author’s calculation using Nepal DHS (2011).
Table 5 presents the results of the three estimated models. Firstly, it presents
the findings regarding the association between women’s land ownership and their
ability to make decisions alone on at least one decision. We have used a Logit
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regression analysis to predict this relationship, and Table 5 shows the OR. First,
land ownership increases the probability of having the final say alone on at least
one decision by 52 %. At the same time being empowered seems to be less
likely for women who live in landless household, but this association is not sta-
tistically significant. As regards the employment remuneration, being paid in
cash or simultaneously in cash and in kind increases the probability of being
more empowered, while payments in kind have not any statistical significance.
Surprisingly, household wealth is not statistically significant. Caste is not asso-
ciated to a higher decisional power, with the exception of the Tibeto-Burman
women, who are more likely to take almost one decision alone. This finding is
consistent with that one of Allendorf (2007), who explained it with the higher
freedom of movement of this ethnic group. When comparing education levels,
only the secondary one appears to affect the female farmers’ possibility to make
decisions alone: this is not unexpected, as higher education should be correlated
to a higher consciousness of their rights and role within the society. Finally, con-
sidering the place of residence, urban location does not exert any statistically
significant influence in enhancing women’s empowerment.
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Table 5: Regression results from Logit, Ordered Logit and OLS mod-
els.
Final say, OR Empowerment Scale, OR Empscore
constant 0.12 (0.03) 4.74*** (0.32)
Place of residence
Urban 1.20 (0.14) 1.02 (0.1) 0.03 (0.18)
Religion
Hindu 1.00 (0.12) 0.82** (0.08) -0.19 (0.18)
Caste ethnicity
High Caste 0.97 (0.11) 0.97 (0.09) 0.02 (0.16)
Tibeto-Burman 1.26** (0.14) 1.15 (0.10) 0.37** (0.16)
Other (Ref.) 1.00 1.00
Household wealth
Richest 1.26 (0.22) 1.81*** (0.28) 0.97*** (0.27)
Richer 1.09 (0.14) 1.36*** (0.15) 0.54*** (0.19)
Middle 0.88 (0.1) 1.19** (0.11) 0.35*** (0.16)
Poorer 0.94 (0.09) 1.24*** (0.10) 0.38*** (0.15)
Poorest (Ref.) 1.00 1.00
Wife of the household head 1.16 (0.12) 2.87*** (0.26) 1.89*** (0.15)
Age 1.02*** (0.01) 1.03*** (0.005) 0.06*** (0.008)
Employment remuneration
Paid in cash 1.96*** (0.39) 2.23*** (0.40) 1.48*** (0.32)
Paid in kind 1.03 (0.16) 1.66*** (0.22) 0.99*** (0.24)
Paid both in kind and in cash 1.99*** (0.37) 1.80*** (0.30) 1.37*** (0.3)
Unpaid (Ref.) 1.00 1.00
Education
Primary 1.02 (0.11) 1.23** (0.11) 0.31** (0.16)
Secondary or more 1.44*** (0.17) 1.68*** (0.17) 0.92*** (0.18)
None (Ref.) 1.00 1.00
Land rights
Lives in landless household 0.94 (0.16) 0.72*** (0.11) -0.63** (0.27)
Owns land herself 1.52***(0.2) 1.70*** (0.2) 1.08*** (0.2)
Lives in landed household (Ref.) 1.00 1.00
Nb. of observations 3600
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03
Source: Author’s calculation using Nepal DHS (2011). Standard errors into brackets.
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Turning to the results of the ordered logit analysis, a clear benefit of female
land ownership in the empowerment of Nepalese women is evident: as data high-
light, the odds that a woman is more empowered are 70% larger if they own
land. By comparison, the odds of women who live in landless household reduces
their probability of having a higher decisional power by 28%. As expected,
the different types of remuneration are a source of empowerment. Specifically,
receiving payment in cash increases the odds that a woman is empowered by
123%, while being paid in kind increases it by a half. As expected, on the other
hand, the detention of a source of income acquired independently reduces the
need to remain anchored to the male economic support. Likewise, primary edu-
cation is associated to an increase of the odds by 23%, while the secondary more
than doubles the odds. Alike, the household wealth has a crucial importance
in promoting the decision-making power of the women: as expected the richest
quintile, inter alia, improves the odds of a woman to a greater extent than the
poorer one. Additionally, being wife of the household head considerably raises
their possibility of being more empowered. As pointed out in the logit anal-
ysis, the fact that higher education qualification increases the decisional role
of women within the household could be associated to the higher awareness of
their role and importance within society. Caste belonging has been inserted in
the specification model, but it appears to have not a significant influence on
the women’s empowerment. This is in contrast with the findings of Allendorf
(2007), as well as with the Logit regression results we presented above (and with
the OLS ones that we will show later in the section): in fact they found that
Tibeto- Burman women were more likely to be more empowered, in part due to
the more egalitarian gender norms that are common in this caste. Conversely,
it can be observed that Hindu religion reduces the odds of being empowered by
18%. This can be attributed to the gender roles within Hindu society: in fact,
as Dube (1988) and Banerjee (2003) state, the image of the male dominance is
embedded within the societal structure. As repeatedly emphasized and hypoth-
esized, female land titling is positively associated to the role women play in the
decision-making process within the household. However, as the gender studies
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evidence, land does not represent the only source of empowerment. In fact ac-
cess to other productive resources (e.g. fertilizer, machinery, etc.), as well as
to technology and advisory services (Obayelu and Ogunlade, 2006), could fur-
ther promote their active role in the agricultural sector. Besides, comparing the
odds ratios for land ownership with those concerning employment remuneration
- namely payment in cash - it can be observed that land ownership is relatively
less beneficial than working with cash payments.
Finally, the OLS results confirm that land titling has a crucial role in determin-
ing the decisional power of female farmers. Contrariwise, women who live in
landless households appear to have less decision power compared to those who
work in landed households (the reference category) and, even more, those who
own land. In part it can be considered as obvious, as they do not possess land
and work outside the household. Clearly, all the three types of employment re-
muneration increase the autonomy of women, giving them less dependence from
men: particularly being paid in cash improves the women’s decisional power.
Empowerment also depends on the level of education they have achieved: in
fact, as the table shows, women who have a secondary or more qualification
seem to have a higher decision-making power than those ones who have a pri-
mary education, probably because education gives them more awareness about
their rights and duties. Also being wife of the household head is significant
for enhancing women’s empowerment. Even age has a positive impact on the
women’s final say: this could be explained in terms of “weakness” of young wives
and “enforcement” of their role after a certain period they live in the household.
Additionally, the household wealth, as well as the caste membership, seem to
have a significant impact on women’s agency within the household decisional
domain: specifically, a highest level of wealth, as well as belonging to the Tibeto-
Burman castes, have a positive association with the increase in empowerment.
Finally, considering the place of residence, specifically the urban location, all
the three regression models adopted in the present analysis agree on its sta-
tistical non significance. Overall, the results we obtained implementing three
different models all confirm our hypothesis: recognizing land titling to female
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farmers is an important source - even if not the only one - of empowerment,
and could represent another step forward to increase women’s empowerment in
agriculture.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper sets out to determine the role of land titling in promoting work-
ing women’s empowerment in agriculture in Nepal. Specifically, the purpose
was to investigate whether female land ownership could increase their decision-
making power within the household, which we use as a proxy of empowerment.
In fact land represents the basic capital asset in agriculture, and its ownership
is considered a means to get out of poverty. As the related literature empha-
sizes, despite their active role and their importance in the agricultural sector,
the majority of women has not any property right. This fact has negative im-
plications, as it increases the dependence and vulnerability to which women in
general, and even more those ones from rural developing areas, are traditionally
subjected. For this reason, even if we know that other productive assets (e.g.
money, machinery, fertiliser, technology, etc.) all could positively affect women’s
role in the agricultural sector, in this study we focus on land, whose property
could certainly be considered crucial for women’s empowerment in agriculture.
To this end, we have constructed three measures of empowerment, on the ba-
sis of women’s ability to make decisions alone or jointly with their partners,
as opposed to the case in which decisions are taken by their partners alone or
by someone else. Following Allendorf (2007), we have first created a dummy
variable, which differentiates between women who make at least one decision
in one of the four decisional domains described in the data section, with the
other ones. Addind to Allendorf’s model, we buid a second indicator, an ordi-
nal empowerment scale that ranges between 1 and 4, depending on the degree
of women’s involvement in the decision-making process within the household.
Finally, we have introduced a new measure of empowerment on a continuous
scale, ranging between 4 and 16, that measures the degree of women’s decision-
power and reflects more accurately its variability.
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All the three ways to proxy empowerment confirm the hypothesis that rec-
ognizing land titling to women could effectively promote their empowerment,
expressed in terms of decisional power, in the Nepali context. Obviously, as
pointed out several times in this paper, land alone can effectively ensure a
temporary empowerment of female farmers. In fact it must be associated to a
change of both formal and informal rules within society, that could recognize the
central role of women and their importance. At the same time, women should
have access to other productive inputs (such as credit, machineries, extension
services) that may have important effects in terms not only of agricultural pro-
ductivity, but also of both women and household’s health. Additionally, our
findings show that employment remuneration, and more specifically being paid
in cash, increases the odds ratio of being more empowered. As stated before,
this could depend on the fact that earning money raises women’s autonomy,
permitting them to move out of the traditional male dependence. Hence, while
land ownership does not appear to be superior to being paid in cash, it surely
plays a crucial role in women’s empowerment in agriculture. However, even if
in the last decades the need of recognizing women as active members of the
economy and not as invisible farmers has been emphasized, many barriers per-
sist. Particularly in countries like Nepal, where informal rules determine the
persistence of a male-dominated society, increasing the influence women can
exert within the family is still difficult. At the same time, our findings rein-
force the hypotheses of the benefits of land ownership, that Allendorf (2007)
had already studied. At the same time our results reveal that Nepal has reg-
istered important progress in terms of women’s empowerment: specifically, in
2011 the share of women who have final say alone has increased by almost 8
percent in each category of land titling, respecting to DHS 2001 (the dataset
used by Allendorf). This is a successful achievement, particularly in a context
where women are still discriminated. However, whilst this study offers some
insight into the effects of land ownership on gender roles within the Nepalese
agricultural sector, a number of weaknesses must be pointed out. First of all,
the absence of other important variables, as the ownership of livestock (that
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is another relevant asset in agricultural contexts), as well as other productive
assets could not provide a wider understanding of the effective empowerment
of women in agriculture: in fact, as previously specified, land ownership is not
sufficient to raise women’s decisional power. Secondly, the nature of data does
not permit to do a longitudinal evaluation of women’s empowerment. After all,
empowerment is a process of change, that cross-sectional data (as those used in
this study) cannot reflect. Therefore, more research is needed, possibly having
at disposal panel data, in order to analyse the empowerment for what it truly
is: a process of growth and change, that occurs not only at an individual, but
mainly at a collective level.
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CHAPTER 2
Is time allocation gender
sensitive to food price
changes?
An investigation of male and female
labour supply in Uganda.
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Abstract
Dramatic spikes in food prices, like those observed over the last years, represent
a real threat for food security in developing countries, with severe consequences
for many aspects of the human life. In fact, price instability can also affect the
intra-household allocation of time, thus changing the labour supply of women,
who traditionally play the role of “shocks absorbers”. In this paper we in-
vestigate the relationship between the change in the prices of the two major
staples consumed, matooke and cassava, have had on the labour time allocation
of Ugandan households. We exploit the panel nature of the Uganda National
Household Survey to control for individual fixed-effects, adopting a Tobit-hybrid
model. Our results show that, in correspondence with the change in food prices,
gender differentials in the intra-household allocation of labour actually occur.
We find that, overall, women work significantly more, since the additional hours
women work in the market are not counterbalanced by a relevant reduction in
the other labour activities. For men, we do not find any significant effect.
Keywords: price change, labour supply, gender, Uganda.
JEL codes: J16, J22, J43, Q11
42
1. INTRODUCTION
After a period of relative stability of staple food commodity prices, the world
has experienced a dramatic spike in the price of such commodities, that has gen-
erated a widespread debate on the welfare implications it could have, and for the
risks in terms of food security (Caracciolo et al., 2014; Dimova, 2015). This is-
sue is particularly relevant for low-income countries, where people spend a large
share of their income for food (Mukasa and Berloffa, 2015), leading to a concern
that hunger and poverty will increase across the world. At the same time, the
role of agriculture is central for most of the African countries: hence the most
vulnerable and affected by price surges will be poor farm households, due to
their high dependency on the food market (Benson et al, 2008). As argued by
Barret and Dorosh (1996) “real food price increase raise gross incomes of the
many farmers who make gross commodity sales, while small farm households
that are net purchasers of food may suffer substantial instantaneous declines
in welfare” (p. 667). In this regards, women are the most vulnerable, since
they are in a subordinated position, and this is particularly marked in develop-
ing countries: in fact, they are rarely engaged in remunerated activities, such
that their full involvement in unwaged family labour holds out the possibility
of empowerment (Ilahi, 2001). In other words, their labour is traditionally used
for household production rather than for the labour market (Aly and Shields,
2010). Likewise, as Quisumbing (1996) claims, it is difficult for a woman to
choose between market participation and leisure, since part of non-market time
is reserved to home production activities.
In this paper we focus on the case of Uganda, a country firstly “excluded” by
the global food price crisis, thanks to its geographical isolation from the interna-
tional markets, using the three panel waves of the Uganda National Household
Survey (2009-2010; 2010-2011; 2011-2012) for the empirical analysis.
World prices of staple foods have increased since 2006, with a sharp rise in ce-
real prices during 2007-08 (Simler, 2010). The widespread consequences affected
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both developed and developing countries, and Uganda was no exception. How-
ever, although the Ugandan food markets are relatively isolated from the global
markets, such that most of the principal major food (as matooke1) are traded
at local level, the country has been still hit by the food price crisis, as observed
by Van Campenhout et al. (2013). This fact occurred even though food prices
remained relatively stable until the first half of 2008, rising annually at about 5
percent (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, UBOS). Thus far, a growing body of the
literature have explored the causes and consequences of food price shocks, with
a special focus on the welfare aftermath among poor people, predicting severe
negative implications for the welfare of the poorest. Meanwhile, little research
took into account the effects on labour supply and, more specifically, on how the
price trend may shape time use. Indeed, as suggested by Dito (2011), food price
shocks could determine a variation in hours devoted to both on and off-farm
activities.
This paper thus could contribute to the study on the labour response to
price shocks from a gender perspective, using time as the primary criterion
of analysis. Indeed, as it will be argued in the following paragraphs, time is
one of the major obstacle to poverty reduction, especially when considering the
gender division of labour. Specifically, the main purpose of our research is to
understand whether and how male and female labour time respond to price
changes. As noted by Kumar and Quisumbing (2011), in fact, literature lacks
of empirical evidence of the gendered impacts of the crisis. Moreover, a number
of authors have considered the welfare effects of the recent price crisis, mainly
taking into account the change in food consumption and production. Consider-
ing that women are often the “shock absorbers” of the household, as they tend
to reduce their own consumption to leave more food for the other household
members (Kumar and Quisumbing, 2011), it can be supposed that also in their
1 Matooke, also known as matoke, is a starchy banana cooked and consumed as a staple
food.
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time use women bear the brunt of price surges. Moreover, time is allocated
according to both economic and non-economic criteria, that reflects the speci-
ficity of the cultural and societal rules. As argued by Ilahi (2001), “social roles
and norms dictate a segregation of activities by gender”, with implications for
“the capacity of individuals to reallocate their labor in response to economic in-
centives and to maximize productivity and efficiency” (Kes and Swaminathan,
2005). Indeed, whereby men are often employed in income-generating activities,
women perform household chores or participate to the agricultural tasks of their
household farm. Hence, this paper seeks to extend the impact analyses of food
price movements to both male and female labour behaviour. In particular, the
purpose is to test if changes in staple food prices may perpetuate the gender
bias. In fact, the division of labour could be further radicalized, at the expense
of the time spent for domestic activities, especially care of children, traditionally
a female task.
Given the consistent share of rural farmers, the net market position (namely
if households are net buyers or net sellers) will be included into the analysis, to
get a more complete picture of how the price spike influenced Ugandan workers.
In this research we will focus on five dimension of labour time: paid, domestic,
non-market, farm and agricultural employment. According to the significant
number of zero values in labour time, a censoring model, also known as Tobit
approach of Tobin (1958) has been adopted, controlling for the individual fixed-
effects through a hybrid model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the literature concerning the time allocation. Section 3 describes the
case study. Section 4 describes the data and the estimation strategy. Section 5
presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2. TIME ALLOCATION ACROSS HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
Household’s allocation of time has been treated by a wide part of the litera-
ture, and recently a number of studies have examined the determinants and the
distribution of time in developing countries (Ilahi, 2001). Since Mincer (1962)
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and Becker’s “A theory of the allocation of time” (1965), many papers have in-
vestigated the time distribution within household, also including work at home,
as well as leisure time. In Becker’s theory the household time is supposed to be
maximized through a utility function, so that time is considered in the same way
as a commodity. Gronau (1976), for example, explored the relationship between
the wage rate increase and the working time change, differencing between men
and women: he found that not only a shift from work at home (that also include
children care) to market activities had occurred, but also a reduction in leisure
time, mainly affecting women. Many of the related literature tested the change
in time allocation as a maximization of the utility function, where people are
subjected to the time constraint (T):
max U= (Wt, Lt), (1)
time constraint : T = tpi + t
d
i + t
c
i + t
f
i + t
l
i (2)
where Wt denotes hours of working time, whereas Lt indicates the hours of
leisure time2. Assuming that the allocation of time across the different time use
categories is also dependent on the household welfare, we can write the supply
function of the uses of time:
tki = t
k
i (p
sf
t , v) (3)
where, for each individual i, each time use category (k= p, d, c and l) de-
pends on the price of staple foods (sf ) at time t3 and on both household and
2p, d, c, f and l are time use categories (paid work, domestic tasks, child care, farming
activities and leisure time) for each individual i.
3Likewise, we suppose that the time use function is also affected by the wage of each
individual, but most of the concerning observations were not available. Additionally, the price
of food also conditions the goods expenditure. Therefore, in our empirical model we include
household expenditure on food and non-food items as proxies of the household wealth, that
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individual characteristics, v. Moreover, Hill (1989) reasoned on the context-
specificity of time allocation: as she argues, the presence of a consistent “infor-
mal” sector, through which women are both engaged in the economic activity
and simultaneously care for children and do home-related duties, “complicates
the labor supply decisions” (p. 144). Besides, she defines the choice of labour
participation as a trichotomous problem, since they “may choose to work in the
formal sector of the labor market, in the informal sector [...], or they may choose
not to work” (p.144). Furthermore, the composition of male and female time
allocated to work differs not only on the gender basis, but also between urban
and rural areas. Ilahi (2000), for example, asserts that while men work less than
women both in rural and urban areas, rural women work more than their urban
counterparts. Considering that time is a scarce resource, its allocation implies
a trade-off, which generally interests domestic and market work. This issue
pertains particularly women (Medeiros et al. (2007)), who often gives up their
autonomy for caring their own household. The multiplicity of roles and respon-
sibilities that women and men play is unbalanced against women. Furthermore,
non-economic criteria, such as societal and cultural norms, affect time distri-
bution: specifically, the reproductive responsibilities burdening to women (that
include caring elderly and children, preparing food, cleaning and housework,
collecting water and firewood, and so on), beyond reinforcing the gender gap,
could complicate their participation to more economically productive activities.
Additionally, the composition of the household, as well as the household size,
the number, age and gender of children, also engrave the time patterns, and
this is especially true for women. A similar assumption is made by Warner
and Campbell (2000), who noted that “women have virtually no leisure time”.
Thus, gender discrepancies in time allocation depict a substantial source of dis-
empowerment that, at the same time, consistently affect development.
When evaluating the effects of rising food prices, generally most of the studies
focused on the welfare implications on consumers, partially ignoring that most
could potentially affect time use.
47
of the poor are also producers. A properly assessment of the “producers effects”
requires analyzing not only the possible expansion of food production and the
consequent income improvement, but also the time distribution across market,
non-market and agricultural activities. Klasen et al. (2011) pointed out that
“gender discrimination in the labor market is common phenomenon in both de-
veloped and developing countries”, even if “discrimination in the latter is rather
associated with differential access to wage employment” (p. 4). As regards price
shocks, a large part of the recent literature focused primarily on the income and
consumption effects (Caracciolo et al., 2014; Bellemare et al., 2013; Benson et al,
2008; Headey and Fan, 2008), omitting the influence they could have on labour
supply (Black et al., 2009). Probably one of the first research on the impact of
the 2007/08 food crisis at the household level was that of Benson, Mugarura,
and Wanda (2008). Using the 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey
(UNHS), containing information on more than 7.000 households, they observed
that the incidence of food price movements depends on the net market position,
namely whether households are net buyer or net sellers.
The examination of time use in Sub-Saharan Africa is crucial for many reasons.
Firstly, the concept of time poverty is strictly related to income poverty, for its
consequences for the household and individual well-being. Namely, time consti-
tutes a constraint for labour, especially for women on which, besides the other
productive activities, bear the burden of domestic work. Therefore, given that
women have primary responsibility for cultivating food crops for the household
consumption, changes in food prices may influence the availability of time for
the household members engaged in such activities. Additionally, time is a key
component in the analysis of poverty, especially when accounting for the fe-
male labour one: since women are predominantly engaged in farming activities,
rather than in the paid ones, external shocks such as food price rise can be
expected to increase the time spent on it, eroding their available leisure time, as
well as the hours spent on domestic tasks and children care. Indeed, plenty of
evidence suggest female hours spent on housework is much higher than the male
ones. Hence, how exactly they worked out will be investigated in the following
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sections.
3. CASE STUDY
Worldwide, the main causes of the food price spike are attributable to dif-
ferent factors, including droughts, low stocks for cereals and oilseeds, increased
feedstock use in the production of biofuels, raised costs of food production,
rapidly rising oil prices, as well as the financial speculation in the US markets.
Conversely, in Uganda food prices have been relatively stable for many years
(Benson et al., 2008). This can be attributed to its geographical location. Actu-
ally, Uganda is located in the East African highlands, and its insulated position
partially isolated it from the international markets (Simler, 2010).
Figure 1: Uganda position within the African continent.
Source: http://theisn.org/ and fao.org
As the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) data display, the annual infla-
tion rate of food crops for April 2008 was 1.7%, whereas the monthly inflation
rate indicates a 6.7% increase over March prices. Since the first half of 2008,
when Uganda experienced the first rise in food prices, the pattern of food prices
has been extremely volatile. Actually, likewise the global markets, Uganda reg-
istered a sharp increase in food prices, also relative to other items, since 2009 as
49
shown in Figure 2 below, but the situation eased off during 2010. Afterwards,
a new price hike took place since the beginning of 2011.
Figure 2: Food and Non-Food price indices.
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
In
di
ce
s
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Food crops Rent Fuel Utilities
All items
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
Unlike many developing countries where a single commodity is the dominant
food source (rice for Asia, for example), Uganda has a relatively different mix
of staple food, including matooke, maize, cassava, potato and beans. Table 1
shows the share of the consumption value4, disaggregated by place of residence
(urban or rural) and year. Matooke is the dominant staple food in all the three
years, particularly in the urban areas, whilst cassava, potato and maize appears
prominently in the rural areas5
4Food items purchased out of home, own produced and received in kind as a gift are
aggregated into the unique category of consumption. These are expressed in Uganda Shillings.
5This statement pertains food items consumed in the first and the third wave, to a greater
extent for cassava.
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Figure 2 depicts the matooke price trend of the Mbarara district: since
matooke represents an important share of food consumption, we report the
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pattern of its retail price (prices refer to the period 2009-2014, and only for
2013 and 2014 singularly). Data are from the Uganda Price Bulletin (October
2014), which uses the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)
Uganda, a USAID-funded activity, which is specialized in the monitoring of
trends in staple food prices in countries vulnerable to food insecurity.
Figure 3: Nominal retail prices of Matooke (Mbarara district).
Source: FEWSNET Uganda, 2014.
Matooke shows a fluctuating trend, following an upward trend in the last
year. Especially in 2013, we can observe a raise in the average values, whereas
in 2014 prices appear to decrease. Such a substantial increase in food price,
where food expenditure is such a relevant share of household budgets, must
have impacted not only the consumption side, but also the individual labour
supply behaviour.
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1. Data description
The analysis relies on the last three waves of the Uganda National House-
hold Survey (UNHS; 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12), a multipurpose nationally
household survey conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), with
the support of the Living Standard Measurement Study-Integrated Survey on
Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) project of the World Bank. Composed of five mod-
ules (Socio-economic, woman, agriculture, community and price modules), only
the household and some sections of the agricultural questionnaires have been
used, as they contains all the data needed for the analysis. The UNHS pro-
vides, inter alia, detailed information on household characteristics, i.e. age,
gender, education and economic activity, as well as on the level and structure
of the household expenditure. Nearly 3000 households were interviewed, with a
randomly-selected share of split-off households formed after the 2005/06 survey.
The total number of households and individuals by wave are presented in Table
2 below:
Table 2: Survey description.
Years Number of households Number of individuals
2009-10 2975 18734
2010-11 2716 19180
2011-12 2850 21279
Source: Author’s elaborations, using UNHS (2009-10; 2010-11; 2011-12).
4.2. Sample selection
For the purposes of the study, we restricted our sample to a total number
of 15093 panel adult men and women. With more details, we concentrate our
empirical analysis on men and women, aged between 15 and 646 who report
6According to the UNHS, Section 8 of the Household Questionnaire - referring to the
Labour Force Status - have been formally administered to individuals falling in the age group
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zero or positive values. Specifically, as the number of missing was relevant7,
above all for paid job, we create the category of working people on the basis of
the labour variable for which we have more observations (99% of our sample),
namely “Fetching firewood” for women and “Making major repairs” for men8.
Then, we create a binary variable, working people, at which we attributed 1
whenever zero or positive data were present in the considered questions, and 0
otherwise. After that, we substituted missing values of the “labour hours vari-
ables” with zero whenever the variable working people assumed the value of 1.
Therefore, our sample reduces to 15.093 working individuals (7.302 and 7.791
men and women respectively).
However, due to missing prices in some districts, when running the regression
the total number of observations further reduces to 10117 individuals, of which
4869 are men and 5248 are women9.
4.3. Labour time behaviour
Time is a scarse resource, and the determination of time to spend on vari-
ous activities is very difficult (Medeiros et al., 2007). On average, an adult is
recommended to sleep for almost eight hours per day, but this cannot be consid-
ered a generalized recommendation, above all in developing countries. In fact,
in rural economies a variety of activities, such as farm production, domestic
tasks, animal husbandry, are performed within the household (Skoufias, 1996).
Tiberti and Tiberti (2015), for example, assumed that each household member
aged between 15 and 60 years has 10 hours per day of leisure time. At the
same time, the amount of leisure does not consider the “extra-time” devoted
to inside household chores, such as caring children, cooking, and so on. This
“5 years and above”. Unfortunately, when controlling for labour hours, data on labour time
were present also for people below this age category. As there were many outliers, we decided
to focus on the “formal” working group.
7It is attributable to the high number of non-working respondents in paid labour questions.
8In general, most of the questions in the section “non-market activities” contained infor-
mation, so that the number of missing was low.
9They become 9302 -4488 and 4814 men and women respectively- when taking into con-
sideration all the main staples consumed, as shown in tables reported in Appendix B
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matter particularly for women. Therefore, the measure of labour supply should
be extended to include both time worked for a wage and time devoted to home
and farming activities.
The questionnaire provides detailed information on different labour activities.
Specifically, interviewees were asked “In this (main) job/business that [NAME]
had during the last week, was [NAME]”:
1. Working for someone else for pay?
2. An employer?
3. An own-account worker?
4. Helping without pay in a household business?
5. An apprentice?
6. Working on the household farm or with household livestock?
Additionally, in the section “Non-market labour activities”, specific questions
were asked about the hours devoted (in the 7 days before the interview)to:
1. Fetching firewood.
2. Collecting water.
3. Milling.
4. Making handicrafts.
5. Hunting and fishing.
6. Making major repairs in their dwelling or farm.
7. Constructing your dwelling or farm.
8. Agricultural activities.
In order to simplify the analysis, we collapsed all these information into five
broad categories:
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? market work : it includes wage and employer hours and own-account
workers;10
? non-market restricted activities: unfortunately, we have not domestic
data at disposal. More specifically, this type of information were present
only for the last two waves. Therefore, in order to level our data, we de-
cided to refer to fetching firewood, collecting water and milling as proxies
for domestic work;
? non-market extended work : obtained adding to the previous work-
ing group data listed above (“Non-market labour activities”), excluding
agriculture;
? working on the household farm : it considers only hours devoted to
the management of the household farm;
? agricultural work : it accounts all the hours spent in working in agricul-
ture.11
Data about working time are recorded on a weekly basis. For the purposes of
our analysis, we decided to convert them on annual hours, by multiplying the
total working hours- diversified by activities- by 52 (the total available weeks
in a year). We assumed that each household member works 15 hours per day
(that includes hours spent on market, on farm and domestic tasks). Therefore,
in a week the total time devoted to working is equal to 105 hours, that become
5475 in a year. Considering that the total annual available time is 8760, the
total amount of leisure time (that comprises also “sleeping” time), obtained by
subtracting 8760 by the annual working hours, will be 3285 h/year. In Table
3 annual and weekly hours for all the time-use categories previously mentioned
are shown. They are reported differentiated by wave and gender. As argued, the
10Own-account workers refers to people who work in a business for themselves. For this
reason we included them in the market group.
11In order to avoid possible errors in the estimation, we control whether time spent on
household farm and agriculture coincide. We found that only for a few individuals hours in
the two activities were the same. Thus, we decided to keep the two working activities separate.
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regression sample reduces to 10117 working individuals. Therefore basic statis-
tics were predicted on this sample, as presented in Table 6 above. Moreover, in
order to give a complete framework, in Table 9 in Appendix, we also present
statistics for the whole sample (15.093). As affirmed, time data contain many
zero values: for this reason we also set out the average labour time “depurated”
by the presence of zero values (Table 4).
As expected, most of the women spent their time in the agricultural and farming
activities, for which we can observe an increase within the time period consid-
ered, offset by a reduction in domestic and non-market activities. As regards
market work, indeed, a decrease of about 7% has been registered between the
two first waves, and then hours grow again. Additionally, it can be noted that,
obviously, the number of observations is further reduced. Notwithstanding, men
seem to work more hours in remunerated activities, with a constant trend in all
the three wave years. Moreover, as expected, their time devoted to domestic
activities is less than for their female counterpart. After having defined the data
structure, in the next section the empirical specification will be set up.
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4.4. Food Prices
All the three UNHS includes detailed price information on the household
survey. These are contained in the Household Food Consumption Expenditure
Section, which records data at household level. The questionnaire comprehends
both market and farm gate price (they differ from each other because in the
first one transport and marketing services costs are included), even though in
our analysis market prices only are taken into consideration. To avoid excluding
many observations, due to the presence of many missing values, we computed
prices at district level. Specifically, we used the average market price at the dis-
trict level and its variation to measure price instability.12 Afterwards, nominal
district prices have been deflated with the monthly consumer price index, so
that all prices are expressed as price indices in January 2008 Ugandan shillings
(to obtain real prices, it is sufficient to multiply it with 100).13.
In table 5 below the price indices of the main food categories (namely: ma-
tooke, cassava, maize, beans and fruits and vegetables) for each panel year are
reported:
12For some district data were missing in all the three waves, or at least in one of the survey
rounds. However, we decided to keep all the price variables in the main analysis, as missing
are unevenly distributed among the price variables, so that dropping some district would have
meant erasing information.
13According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics the Consumer Price Index for food crops,
computed using 2005/6 as the base year, was equal to 103.8. This discretional choice is
attributable to the first price spike registered in the country. Following Edmonds and Pavcnik
(2005), we decided to consider the price deflator at national level, and not at the regional one,
“because we do not want the deflator to drive the variation in price”.
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Table 5: Real price indices for the main food consumed in Uganda
(expressed in Uganda shillings).
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Mean Mean Mean
Matooke 49.90 39.53 44.11
Cassava 11.18 12.08 20.02
Maize 7.99 15.24 13.63
Cereals 14.12 12.45 20.58
Beans 10.6 5.98 12.74
Fruits & Vegetables 4.86 6.82 7.3
Source: Author’s calculation using UNHS 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12.
As can be observed, whilst for most of the staples reported in Table 5 the real
price indices increased in the reference period, for matooke -that, in comparison,
is the item with the higher price- there was a decreasing trend in 2010, offset
by a rise in the following year (2012)14.
4.5. Other explanatory variables
The socio-economic variables, such as education, age, marital status, ur-
ban/rural and regional place of residence chosen as a control, are all at individual
level. Education is a categorical variable, taken the value of 1 for those one who
have no education, 2 for people who have a primary education level, while 3 and
4 refer to women and men who reach a secondary and higher education respec-
tively.15 Additionally, we introduce also a seasonality binary variable, used to
control for the cropping season during which the questionnaire has been admin-
istered. Also the household size, as well as the total number of children aged 5
14In percentage terms, there was a reduction of almost 21% between the first two panel
years, followed by a new increase of at least 11.5%.
15In order to make the interpretation of the related coefficient more straightforward, we
constructed four dummy variables, one for each level of education.
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or below have been considered, as we suppose that they could have a significant
influence on time labour, especially for women.16 Moreover, the value of the
total food and non-food expenditure information have been used to construct
a proxy of the household welfare: indeed, we expect that higher prices impact
more on poorer than in richer households. The basically descriptive statistics
are presented in Table 6 below, and they refer to the full regression sample of
both working men and women (10117 individuals). Unfortunately, due to the
presence of many missing in food price variables, as stated before, we had to
take into account only the share of people on which regression run.17. Turning
to the descriptive statistics, most of the sample individuals live in rural areas
(about 70%), as expected, are spouses married monogamously, and have almost
a primary education level. Whether the mean values of the control variable are
about similar between men and women, however we can observe that household
are mainly headed by men.
16Although we were aware that titling measures, such as farm, land and inputs ownership
could influence time allocation, particularly hours devoted to farming work, we do not consider
them, as it is the scope of another essay.
17In Appendix A we set out also the ones concerning the whole working sample.
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Finally, by virtue of the high dependence of most of the Ugandan households
by food price, we introduce also the Net market position, which will be detailed
in the next paragraph.
4.6. Net Market Position: net buyers and net sellers of staple food
Households in Uganda are typically both producers and consumers of a range
of commodities. Therefore, when looking at the price change consequences,
many factors have to be taken into account: the geographical location, namely
the belonging district and the residence area (urban or rural) are relevant as-
pects. Van Campenhout et al. (2013), for example, found that the reduction
in welfare due to the increase in the price of matooke have been more incisive
for urban rather than rural people. Additionally, Dimova (2015) deduces that
“rising food prices may boost welfare in contexts where the poor (especially
women) are among the largest net food producers and may generate new em-
ployment [...]” (p.1), thus improving welfare. Higher prices, in fact, may hurt
the welfare of net buyers, especially if the good demand is inelastic, as in the
case of staple food. Meanwhile, the impact on producers may be ambigous as,
if on one hand food price increase could have an income effect, on the other one
the expansion in food production may be not accompanied simultaneously by
an increase in demand, causing a null welfare effect. At the same time, such
analysis requires to explore the implications of food price spikes for both urban
and rural consumers and producers. Finally, consumers and producers decisions
are not separable, particularly in the case of smallholder farmers. Thereafter,
a key consideration when analysing the degree to which individual time use is
likely to be affected by food price change is the identification of the Net Mar-
ket Position (NPR, henceforth). In fact, although the impact of higher food
prices can be very diverse, depending by commodity, by country, and also by
the characteristics of the households, generally it can be stated that, whereas
food purchasers can be affected adversely18, on the other hand food producers
18Rising prices reduces the real purchasing power of such households. Ivanic and Martin
(2008) multi-country study of the first-order welfare changes of households shed light the
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may benefit from this increase.
Conceptually, a net buyer of food is an individual/household who spend more
to purchase food than he receives from his food sales. Conversely, net sellers of
food are those whose food sales are higher than the quantity purchased (Benson
et al., 2008). For each household it has been determined considering the total
market value of quantities sold (Qsi ) and consumed (Q
c
i )
19 of the following food
items categories: matooke, cassava, potato20, maize, cereals21, beans, fruits and
vegetables, and other food. In more detail, a household is defined as a net seller
if (Qsi )>(Q
c
i ), and otherwise for net buyers. According to our sample data, the
majority of the Ugandan households are net buyers of food, with the exception
of matooke, for which the 16.4% of households are net sellers (Table 10 in Ap-
pendix A). At the same time, disaggregating by the area of residence, we can
observe that for all the staples net sellers are concentrating in rural areas (for
matooke, for example, the value raises to 18.8%). Conversely, the majority of
net buyers are polarised in the urban ones.
However, as Benson et al. (2008) remark, “while conceptually the idea of net
sellers and net buyers is relatively clear, defining who is net seller or a net buyer
can be more problematic” (p. 519). Indeed, the examination of consumption
of staple food and the categorization of households into such “market” groups
can neglect the share of people who do not participate in food markets.22 For
these reasons, we expanded our assessment to the share of households who con-
sume what they produce (we defined them as “autarkic”). Data point up that
for most of the staples (except for maize and cereals), the majority are autar-
kic households who set aside a share of their production for own consumption.
However, we insert as control variables only net purchasers.
overall negative impact on poverty.
19The value of consumption includes only the items purchased out of home.
20Potato includes Irish, fresh and dried potatoes, according to the food list available into
the dataset.
21This category comprehends millet, sorghum and rice.
22This is the case of autarkic households, who consume what they produce, or who received
food “informally”, as a gift.
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4.7. Empirical strategy
Our primary interest is to measure the effects of food prices on female and
male labour supply, in terms of hours devoted to market, non-market and agri-
cultural activities. Labour supply equations could therefore be estimated using
a system in which each labour activity is computed through five different equa-
tions, each for the labour activities into consideration. Since the dependent
variable, namely time use, has a number of zero values, a censored regression
model - also referred to as Tobit model - is to be preferred (McDonald and
Moffit, 1980). Specifically, censoring applies when the values of the dependent
variable should be restricted to a range of values, e.g. higher than zero. There-
fore, the model takes into account the probability of being “observed”, namely
the probability of working and therefore to have labour time above zero (Greene,
2008). So, the total effect of x on y can be decomposed into two parts: “1) the
change in the dependent variable for the observations above the limit, weighted
by the probability of being above the limit; 2) the change in the probability of
being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of y if above” (McDonald
and Moffitt, 1980). Thus the equation assumes the following form:
yit∗ = Xitβ + αi + it it ∼ N(0, σ2) (4)
yit = max(0, y∗it), i = 1, ..., N t = 1, ..., T. (5)
where y∗ denotes the latent variable, which satisfies the classical linear model
assumptions: in fact it has a normal, homoskedastic distribution with a linear
conditional mean23, i is the individual index and t the time period. Moreover,
Xit is a vector of exogeneous variables, β is a vector of the parameters of interest
and αi is the unobserved individual specific effect. Finally, the error term  is
assumed to be a normal random variable with mean zero and variance σ2.
In the traditional Tobit model, the data are censored at 0. Thus the observed
23For a detailed and straightforward description of the model, see also Wooldridge, 2002.
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y can be defined by the following measurement equation:
yi =
y∗ if y∗ > 00 if y∗ ≤ 0 (6)
It implies that the observed variable y equals y* when y* ≥ 0, and y = 0 when
y* < 0 (Wooldridge, 2002). However, in this paper we introduce an upper
limit, 5475, according to the hypothesis that working people work 15 hours per
day (that become 5475 in a year), as already pointed out in the data section.
Therefore, we can rewrite the equation as:
yi =

y∗ if 0 > y∗ > 5475
0 if y∗ ≤ 0
5475 if y∗ ≥ 5475
(7)
Thus, when interpreting coefficients, the estimation has to be considered as the
effect of the regressors on the latent variable. Moreover, when considering panel
data, the error term it can be disaggregated into:
it = αi + λt + uit (8)
where αi is the individual effect (indicating all the unobservable characteris-
tics specific to the unit i that is assumed constant over time), λt is the time effect
(representing all the unobservable characteristics of time period t, assumed as
constant for all the cross-sectional units in the sample), and uit is the random
term which varies over time and individuals, assumed to be uncorrelated over
time (Calzolari et al., 2001).
However, the Tobit approach fits a random-effects model, not contemplat-
ing the fixed-effects. Honore´ (1992) developed a semiparametric estimator for
Tobit fixed-effects, but it is difficult to implement in this paper. To remedy for
this, we construct a fixed-effect version of our basic model by implementing an
hybrid model technique (Schunk, 2013; Allison, 2005; Neuhaus and Kalbfleish,
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1998), in which both the fixed and random-effects models are combined, taking
advantage from both models. Allison (2005) claims that the “hybrid method
allows for the estimation of fixed-effects coefficients for time-varying while also
estimating the effects of time-invariant predictors”(p. 105). According to the
model specification, the time-varying covariates are decomposed into two com-
ponents: the between-cluster covariate (X¯i = n
−1
i
∑n
k=1Xij)
24, that allows to
measure differences between individuals, and the within-cluster one, (Xij−X¯i),
that captures the effects of the entity over time. More specifically, while the
between-cluster predictors measure the cluster mean, the within component in-
dicates the deviations of each covariate from the cluster mean.
Hence, our labour time equations - each for the five working time categories -
can be specified as:
LT ki = β0 + β1Xi + βBX¯i + βW (Xi − X¯i) (9)
where LT describes the individual labour time (in annual hours), disaggregated
by gender, for each working category k (that, as stated yet, refers to market,
domestic, non-market, farming and agricultural working hours, respectively).
However, Xi is the vector of covariates which are time-invariant (such as ed-
ucation), X¯i reflects the between component B, whereas (Xi − X¯i) illustrates
the within predictors, W of time-varying variables for both working men and
women. The equation system has been estimated using the statistical software
STATA 13.
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our main purpose is seeking to determine how food price instability relate
to labour time among working men and women. The estimates are presented in
Tables 7 and 8. Although the information about time use are on a weekly basis
within the questionnaire, the analysis has been carried out using the annual ones.
24In our model cluster is represented by working men and women. For more details, see
also Mundlak, 1978; Allison, 2005; Schunck, 2013; Sjo¨lander et al., 2013.
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To take into consideration the geographical differences in prices, market prices
at district level are used, as explained in section 4.4. Additionally, in order to
capture possible differences in time use at geographical level, we also introduce
regions as explanatory variables (namely: Northern, Southern, Eastern, and
Center macro-areas). Before commenting the results, we need to point out that
the number of censored observations is particularly high for market hours, due
to the high number of zero values, and remarkably low for the non-market labour
activities (for which, as already pointed out, positive values have been recorded).
Finally, we reduce our empirical analysis to the two major staples consumed,
matooke and cassava: this choice has led to a final regression sample of 10117
people, namely 4869 and 5248 men and women respectively (the reduction of
the sample is given by the presence of missing values in the price data). For
a comprehensive analysis, we also test the model incorporating the other food
categories25. Lastly, as claimed in Brown et al. (2013), due to the censored
nature of the dependent variables, findings are explained in terms of the expected
value, E(y|y > 0), that means that it is conditional on y > 0.
25Results are drawn in tables 13 and 14 in Appendix: in this case the regression sample
reduces to 9302 people.
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The Table 7 above presents the results. First, changes in food market prices,
namely matooke and cassava, have differentiated effects on male and female
labour behaviour. For instance, the model indicates that the between-women
effect of a unitary change in the price index of matooke is positive only for
the market work, resulting in an opposite effect in domestic and non-market
hours. Certainly, these findings may be because matooke is one of the most
important staple food in the dietary composition of the Ugandan population,
so that women engaged in paid jobs should work more to buy it. Contrariwise,
we found no significant impact on male labour time. Along the same line, the
average labour time for women spending their time in market tasks increases
following an average change in cassava price, whilst no statistically significant
results are shown from the other working categories. On the other hand, the
within-women effect suggests that, for a given woman, a unitary variation in the
matooke real price index is associated to an increase in time devoted to market
tasks by 7.97 hours, counterbalanced by a reduction in both domestic and non-
market activies. However, this last statement only applies to matooke, for which
coefficients are significantly different from zero. Surprisingly, being net buyer
of plantains results in an increasing trend on market labour time for both men
and women, although the magnitude is different, with a slightly higher value in
the female one. One of the possible explanation is that, as women are more con-
cerned for the family food intake than men, they are more likely to increase their
paid time work. For instance, in line with the increase in remunerated labour
hours, men reduce the time devoted to domestic tasks, whereas for women the
coefficient is not significant. Among household’s characteristics the number of
children is particularly influential for both men and women: in fact it is associ-
ated to an average increase in all the working market and non-market activities
at both between and within individual level, although their presence encumber
more on women than men. In fact, it can be observed an increase in domestic
time of about 88 hours per annum vs. the 55 for male individuals. On the
contrary, in line with our hypothesis, the between-household size impacts nega-
tively all the working activities time considered here for both men and women,
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albeit this consideration is shown only at between level. Interestingly, the level
of education is associated to a consistent increase in male and female market
labour time, followed by a complementary reduction in the non-market activi-
ties. In details as expected, being more educated determines a greater increase
in both male and female market labour, combined with a decrease in the other
labour activities considered. However, in this case, whether the reduction in the
domestic and non-market labour categories matches our expectation (as women
devote higher hours to the mentioned activities), the hybrid model shows that
for women with a secondary level of education there is a higher increase in paid
hours than for their male counterpart. Moreover, living in urban areas increases
annual market hours by respectively 1308 and 1749 hours for men and women,
while reducing the time spent in the other labour activities. As concerns the
place of residence, estimation results show that living in urban areas is associ-
ated to an increase in paid hours, higher for women than for men (probably for
the same reasons stated above about the contribution of women to household
food intake, particularly for children and the elderly). Otherwise, in line with
our expectation, we assist to a reduction of both domestic and non-market ac-
tivities with, once again, a larger decrease for female than male labour time.
As regards the relationship with the household head, being a female spouse is
associated to a reduction in paid hours, though an increase in labour time is
registered in both domestic and non-market extended hours. However, results
are not statistically significant. Instead, the opposite results are registered for
male spouses. Moreover, despite the difference in the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients, with the only exception of market labour, we can note that both female
and male children follow the same positive time pattern. Also the marital status
plays an important role: for example, the labout time change seems to be more
significant for divorced or separated women, probably because they are the only
ones who have to deal with the food maintenance of the household. The regional
location too is important in the analysis of price instability and the impact it
have on time allocation. In general, we registered an increasing pattern for at
least all the activities, even though results are different. As concerns the house-
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hold wealth, both richer men and women are the ones who seem to increase
the hours devoted to remunerated hours over the panel time, accompanied by
a more pronounced decreasing pattern in the non-market and domestic hours.
The only “gender” difference is found for non-market working time, for which
results describe asignificant increasing time trend for poorer women.
Moving to working on the household farm and agricultural activities, illustrated
in Table 8, we can see that also in this case the effect of the price change is
different between men and women. Firstly, the between effect of matooke is
surprisingly negative for both men and women, whilst we can observe an oppo-
site effect for male time devoted to the agricultural tasks. Moreover, the within
predictor of hours spent on household farming suggests that, for a given woman,
there is a decrease, whilst it is statistically not significant for men. Addition-
ally, being a net buyer of both matooke and cassava is associated to a reduction
in both the two activities for both men and women. This is in line with the
results of the previous estimation: in fact, being a net buyer is associated to
a higher value in paid work time, since buying the same quantity of matooke
need a higher income. As regards the relationship to the household head, we
can see a positive and statistical significant increase for female time spent on
both farming and agricultural tasks, offset by an opposite effect for men. In-
deed, the increase in the household farming and agricultural time associated to
increasing household size may be related to the need to guarantee a certain food
requirement to the other household components, particularly children and the
elderly, as described yet. The higher the level of education, the greater is the
decrease in both the activities now considered (to a larger extent for men than
for women), also the household wealth is related to a higher decrease in annual
labour time for the richest than for the poorest people even though, once in this
case, the effect is more prominent for the female components. Surprisingly, we
found that women who live in urban areas enhance their time devoted to the
agricultural tasks, contrariwise to the negative trend in the household farming
hours for both the gender. Finally, differently from the findings concerning mar-
ket and non-market annual labour time, in the second cropping season findings
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reveal an increasing statistically significant trend in both the household farming
and agricultural labour time (with the exception of the male household farming
hours).
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6. CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper is to study the effects of soaring food prices
on both male and female labour time in Uganda, in order to verify if a gender
dimension of the recent crisis exists. At this purpose, we make use of a Hybrid
Tobit model with fixed-effects, with both between and within predictors. Given
the purposes of the analysis, we use data at both individual and household
level from the last three waves of the Uganda National Household Survey panel
(2009-10; 2010-11; 2011-12), focusing our analysis on both working women and
men (where this notion refers to individuals who have given a positive answer
to the time labour questions).
Taking into account the two staple foods mainly consumed, matooke and
cassava, we found that a gender differential occured on labour time. In detail
we observe that, over time, the raise in paid hours is more pronounced for women
than men. Contrariwise, the time spent in all the other activities appears to be
decreasing. Surprisingly, the hours spent on the household farm is negatively
associated to a price increase (this statement concerns only the between effect)
for both working men and women, whilst for the agricultural labour time we
found a positive and significant cluster mean for men, whereas for women it is
positive, but not significant. Conversely, when controlling for the cassava price,
the estimated between-effect for both men and women is negative. Therefore, it
is possible to assert that there is a substitution effect in labour time, particularly
evident for women who, even if decreasing both non-market and agricultural an-
nual hours, have to increase their paid hours more than men. One of the possible
reasons may be related to the pivotal “food subsistence role” women play within
the household. More precisely, as the initial amount of remunerated hours was
significantly lower for women than for men, being net buyer of both matooke
and cassava determines a more prominent increase of market labour time for
women than for their male counterpart. When teasing out by food and non-food
expenditure quintiles our findings demonstrate a higher increase of paid labour
78
time for the richest individuals, associated with a more prominent decrease in
the other work categories considered.
Taken together, the findings of this study support the idea that women are
shocks absorbers, since they are the ones who have to change more their labour
behaviour in order to meet the household needs. To be more precise, whilst
apparently the increase in market labour time and the consequent decrease in
the other labour categories may be seen as a form of women’s empowerment,
after the price increase women work more than before, and in this context of
material and time deprivation, it is hard to interpret this as an increase in
empowerment.
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CHAPTER 3
Agricultural productivity in
Uganda:
does gender matter?
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Abstract
The analysis of women’s empowerment in agriculture cannot leave aside the
problem of understanding the sources of gender differences in agricultural pro-
ductivity. Using the Uganda LSMS-ISA (2009-10; 2010-11) we estimate the
value of productivity of crops grown per acre of harvested land at the household
level, on the basis of the gender of the land manager. Results from the Tobit
model with fixed effects confirms the findings of the existing literature: in fact,
controlling also for socio-economic variables and plot characteristics (soil quality,
topography, distance from the homestead), as well as for the use of inputs (both
labour and other inputs than labour) female managed plots are less productive
than plots managed by men. Better individual agricultural data disaggregated
by gender may allow to better identify the reasons of such productivity gap.
Keywords: Agricultural productivity; gender gap; land; Uganda.
JEL codes: J16, J43, Q12
97
1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by gender di-
vision of labour in tasks and crops (Ezumah and Di Domenico, 1995). Albeit
women assist men in the farming activities, so as to be defined as productive
partners in agriculture (Oladejo et al., 2011), they are still subjected to an
“assets discrimination”: besides control over land, access to fertilizer and other
inputs, also extension and training services for improved technologies are denied
to them.
Since the 1970s, a considerable body of the literature has emphasized the role
of women in the agricultural production (Salome, 2014; Elbehri and Lee, 2011;
Elad and Houston, 2002; Warner, 2000; Quisumbing, 1996; Udry, 1996; Bassett,
1993; Blevins and Jensen, 1991). The lower productivity of female headed farms
is a much debated issue. The main reasons of this gender gap can be attributed
to gender differences in: a) access to and control over agricultural inputs; b)
tenure system, credit and extension services constraints, that affect investments
on technologies; c) informal rules that influence the management and market-
ing of the agricultural output (Kilic et al., 2015). Studies in this vein show
that yield differentials are partly due to gender-specific assets and to the credit
constraints women face (Thapa, 2008). Also FAO (2011) has recognized that
equal access to productive resources “could increase yields by 20-30%” (FAO,
2011). Since land is one of the most important economic resource, the recogni-
tion of its entitlement may be relevant for increasing productivity (Masterson,
2007). In fact, its ownership motivates farmers to “make efficiency-enhancing
improvements”(Masterson, 2007) towards technical investments (for example,
by the introduction of improved seeds or machineries). Rural women farmers
are crucial for food production and food security (Salome, 2014). Aside from the
inside home tasks, if men are considered as the main responsible of cash crops,
women are viewed as the most accountable for the production of subsistence
food for home consumption (Doss, 2002). However, despite their vital role in
agriculture and food security, women continue to have lower access to a range
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of productive resources, information and financial assets. This discrimination
has direct consequences for land productivity (Koru and Holden, 2008).
Measuring gender differences in productivity is cumbersome, due to the com-
plexity of farming systems, as well as to the lack of data on inputs and outputs
differentiated by gender. Indeed, plot level information separated by gender
management would be essential for this analysis. Moreover, confusion about
notions of sex and gender contributes to complicate this kind of analysis. As
stated by Quisumbing (1996) “sex differences are due to innate biological differ-
ences between men and women. Gender differences, [...] arise from the socially
constructed relationship between men and women” (p.1580). Furthermore, this
difficulty is also linked with a variety of farming systems, so that estimating
these differences in plots managed jointly by men and women is more compli-
cated (Njuki et al., 2006).
A common limitation of studies measuring the gender differences in agricultural
productivity is that they rely on proxies of individual access to assets and in-
puts, and this is one major reason why results are only partially representative of
the individual true productivity. Therefore, this article sets out to investigate
the extent to which gender differences exist in agricultural productivity, and
whether land ownership and management may influence this gap. In this study,
knowing that land ownership could not be a sufficient condition for explaining
possible differences between plots managed by female and male owners1, we de-
cide to combine land ownership, access and use of plots, and agricultural output
management as the gender land indicator.
Data for this study are drawn from the 2009-10 and 2010-11 waves of the Uganda
Living Standard Measurement Survey- Integrated Survey on Agriculture (LSMS-
ISA henceforth). We use the Agricultural Questionnaire, that contains informa-
1This statement could be more valid for women, who in the case of ownership, acquire
land through inheritance. Moreover ownership does not automatically imply management
since land could be rented-out, so that productivity depends on external factors not directly
imputable to the landowner, such as the use of fertilizers or other inputs.
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tion about the farm management, the inputs use and the output at the household
level. In order to recover as much individual information as possible, we com-
bine the household level information drawn from the agricultural dataset with
the individual information available in the household dataset. This allows us
to take into account also socio-demographic individual indicators, such as age,
education, household size and gender composition of the agricultural household.
In this paper the analysis will be focused on Uganda, a country where agricul-
ture represents a core sector of the economy and where, according to FAO, there
is an almost egualitarian participation of men and women in the agricultural
activities2. The production system is based on smallholder subsistence farming,
dominated by the production of food crops, such as plantains (mainly known
as “matooke”), cereals, cassava and oilcrops (as can be seen in Table 1 below,
where we report the quantity harvested, expressed in kilograms, at the house-
hold level). Since these data contain many zero values (due, for example, to
the fact that when households were visited, plots could have been cultivated,
but not harvested yet), we draw also data “cleaned” by the presence of zero.
Despite its capacity to reach the domestic needs, Uganda imports food products
like wheat, whereas exports are dominated by coffee, followed by cotton, tea,
tobacco and maize.
2For more information, see http://http://faostat.fao.org/CountryProfiles/
Direct.aspx?lang=en&area=226, accessed on November 18, 2015.
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Table 1: Quantity of the main crops harvested (in KGs) by acre of
area under cultivation (2009-10 & 2010-11).
Whole Nb of observation Without zero values Nb of observation
Matooke
6.23
(53.18)
2689
14.68
(80.92)
1140
Cassava
19.93
(219.31)
2689
86.58
(451.02)
619
Beans
10.7
(142.65)
2689
25.12
(217.84)
1145
Maize
19.74
(175.32)
2689
50.40
(277.47)
1053
Potato
17.06
(474.45)
2689
107.16
(1186.33)
428
Source: Author’s calculation from Uganda LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11. Standard
deviation into brackets.
However, focusing on matooke, over the last two decades we can observe that
its agricultural productivity has shown a fluctuating trend, as Figure 1 below
shows, with a decreasing trend since the start of the food price crisis.
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Figure 1: Uganda annual matooke yield (1993-2013).
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In order to model gender productivity, we use a Tobit approach with fixed
effects3. For robustness check, we also run the random-effects model, reporting
results in Appendix.
Findings reveal that gender differences exist in crop productivity, suggesting
that plot-level productivity is lower in female-headed plots, possibly due to the
many constraints women face (access to inputs, credit, extension services). The
paper is structured as follows. We first give a brief overview of the literature
related to gender productivity. We then turn to model (Section 3) and data
description (Section 4). We present our results and their discussion in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes with suggestions for further research and policy implication.
3As the Tobit model in STATA 13 does not contemplate fixed effects, we implemented the
Honore´ (1992) pantob estimator.
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2. RELATED LITERATURE
The literature investigating differentials in agricultural productivity by gen-
der is growing. Since Boserup’s Woman’s role in economic development (1970),
many studies have tried to assess the role of women in agriculture.
The existing evidence on gender differentials in agricultural productivity, is
mixed: if one set of empirical studies agrees on the lower level of productiv-
ity of women (Djurfeldt et al., 2013; Bezabih and Holden, 2010; Holden et al.,
2001; Udry et al., 1995; Jacoby, 1992), another set has found no significant
differences between productivities of male and female farmers. Djurfeldt et al.
(2013) demonstrated that in sub-Saharan Africa only 15% of the landholdings
are held by women who, due to their limited access of inputs, reach lower levels
of yields. Similarly, Koru and Holder (2008) observe yield differentials between
men and women, identifying the causes in discrepancies in the resource endow-
ments, inputs use and market access. This view is also shared by Tiruneh et
al. (2001), who pointed out that if male and female headed households had the
same access to inputs, their level of productivity may likely be the same. In the
same line, Alene et al. (2008) claims that men and women farmers are equally
efficient as farm managers, and their responsiveness to price incentives is alike.
Contrariwise, Akresh et al. (2005) concludes that plots managed by women
are less productive than the ones controlled by men, even after controlling for
observable peculiarities of the plot, such as the plot size4. This result is also
offered by Aly et al. (2010) who, however, controlling for differences in irriga-
tion and use of improved seeds, report that such differences reduce and become
insignificant. In a similar manner Meˆdagbe´ et al. (2010) suggest that, although
women reach a lower level of productivity since they lack control over produc-
tive resources, they are as technically efficient as men. As Quisumbing states
(1995), few studies related to this issue “control for individual endowments by
4Since women control less land than men, plot size is another relevant issue to be explored
when analyzing differences in gender productivity. Overall, plots managed by women are
smaller than the male ones, engraving the output harvested.
103
gender, and even fewer for relationships between individual characteristics (for
example, education, [...]) and input choice” ( p.3), leading to possible overesti-
mated differences in productivity due to gender.
As Quisumbing (1995) demonstrates, female farmers are as equally efficient as
the male ones (in six of the seven country studies she reviews, in fact, the co-
efficients are insignificant, with the exception of Burkina Faso). Also Adesina
and Djato (1997) pointed out that female rice growers in Coˆte d’Ivoire are as
efficient as men. In part, these results are associated to the nature of data used
in the related empirical research: as will be explained later, in fact, agricultural
surveys are mainly administered at household rather than at individual level,
so that it is often difficult to identify the gender of the plot manager or owner.
Farther, most of these studies use the sex of the household head as the unique
gender indicator. However, even if this issue may be addressed through indi-
vidual data on household members (as in the case of the LSMS-ISA), obtaining
information on the use of inputs by gender is harder. One of the possible impli-
cations is that female farmers outcome may be underestimated, leading to the
consideration that they are less productive than men, not accounting that the
allocation of resources may be Pareto inefficient within the household itself.
Land productivity, which is the total output divided by size of the farm, is the
traditional measure used in this field of analysis (Lastarr´ıa-Cornhiel, 1988), al-
though the criticism due to the focus on one input as land (Masterson, 2007).
Since land plays a pivotal role in agriculture, and due to the fact that in devel-
oping countries women are often excluded from its control, emphasizing the role
of gender gaps in land ownership/management could help explaining the gender
gap in agricultural productivity. In this regard, Foltz et al. (2000) assert that
insecure property rights “reduce investments in land management, productive
assets, and new technologies”. However, also in this strand of literature, the
findings are mixed: Bellemare (2013), for example, suggests that formal land
titling does not affect productivity in Madagascar, even though the rights to
leasing out land is negatively associated to it. In this vein, the Fast Track Land
Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe has not been accompanied by a raise
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in agricultural production (Zikhali, 2008). On the other hand, Anyaegbunam
et al. (2010) show that land ownership is positively associated to agricultural
productivity in Nigeria. This view is also supported by Alsop et al. (1996). In
line with this, the study of Bezabih and Holden (2010) reports that, while land
certification impacts positively on plot-level productivity, however the effect
is more pronounced for male-headed households than for female-headed ones.
Furthermore, some studies (Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; Carter and Olinto,
1996) shed light on the potential endogeneity of land titling, and on the prob-
lem of the potential spurious correlation between land tenure and productivity
if endogeneity is ignored. Even though owning land may increase investment on
it, in this paper we assume that land ownership is not a sufficient condition for
explaining gender trends in agricultural productivity. Indeed, as land owner-
ship for women is highly associated with inheritance, in order to examine more
closely the links between gender, land and agricultural productivity, we combine
land ownership, access and use of plots, and agricultural output management,
deriving the variable of “plot manager”, and using the sex of the plot manager
(as we will describe later) as a gender indicator.
2.1. Land Tenure system
Land ownership is a relevant issue, particularly in rural contexts, where liveli-
hoods are highly dependent on agriculture. In many parts of the world, women
obtain access to land through the male components of the family (husbands,
fathers or sons), even though land titling is generally allowed only to men (Doss
et al., 2014) and this is also the case of Uganda. There, as in most countries of
sub-Saharan Africa, women inherit land only in exceptional circumstances (i.e.
when there are no male heirs, see Asiimwe, 2014. There are some exceptions
to this general rule, depending on the specific country legislation: for example,
in Nepal the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution partially extends the
possibility to inherit and own land also to female individuals).
However, when dealing with land rights, it is useful to explore the conceptual
and empirical distinction between ownership and access over land (Lastarria-
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Cornhiel, 1997): land ownership, in fact, implies rights related to the control
and decision over production, while the access to land is related to its use,
without any decisional right over production. The Uganda Land Act of 1998
disciplines the land tenure, ownership and management of the land. In partic-
ular, it held the four historical types of land tenure: freehold, leasehold, mailo
and customary:
• freehold is the ownership of land that guarantees full power of use and
“the compulsory registration of title in perpetuity” (GoU, 2013).
• leasehold is a way of tenure that, as freehold, “referred to as individual
tenure” (Okuku, 2006). It grants a person to take possession and using
land for a specified or limited period. These rights are bestowed by an
agreement with the owner of the land, according to certain conditions and
payment of a rent.
• mailo was created during the colonial period, through the 1900 Buganda
agreement. The land ownership was given to the Buganda chiefs and
notables (Deininger et al., 2008). It permits the separation between the
separation of land from the ownership by a lawful or bona fide occupant,
enabling the holders to exercise all the powers of ownership;
• customary tenure is a traditional ownership tenure system, on the basis
of which land may be owned by the community, clan, families or indi-
viduals. Landholders under this system do not have a formal land ti-
tle, although “All Ugandan citizens owning land under customary tenure
may acquire certificates of ownership [...] of customary tenure” (Arti-
cle 237(4)(a) of the 1995 Constitution and Section 4(1) of the Land Act,
1998).
A further amendment introduced the concept of “family land”: land is con-
sidered the source of livelihoods for the household members, and it cannot be
transferred without the consent of all the individuals depending on it, including
women and children (Deiningen et al., 2008). The article 33 of the Uganda
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Constitution states that women shall be accorded equal rights and treatment as
men, including equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities
(Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). As Doss et al. (2014) pointed
out, the type of customary land may influence the farmer’s behaviour, in terms
of long-term interest and investments.
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION
To assess the extent of possible male-female differences in the agricultural
productivity in Uganda, we estimate the productivity as a measure of the value
of all the crops produced at the household level per acre of land under culti-
vation. Following Owens et al. (2003), this is carried out by multiplying the
physical quantities of all the crops produced per acre (converted to kilograms)
by their unit price, aggregating crops production across plots5. The unit price
has been calculated for each household, by dividing the value of the total sales
by the overall quantity sold. Whether missing were present, due probably to
the lack of food sold, we imputed productivity considering the median price of
the district where the household lives. The value of the multi-crop productivity
is expressed in Ugandan shilling. Farther, although the low number of observa-
tions, we also estimate the value of productivity for the main crops produced,
namely matooke, cassava, potato (both sweet and Irish), maize and beans, re-
porting findings in the Appendix.
As the scope of this study is to investigate gender differences in agricultural
productivity in Uganda, we propose to introduce as gender indicator a variable
that differs from the ones used in the existing related literature: the gender of
the “land manager”, that considers both the head of the household head, and
of his/her spouse. More specifically, with the notion of “land manager” we refer
to the person who, in each household, has the ownership and right use of plots,
5The agricultural questionnaire records data at both the plot and parcel levels. Despite
the presence of multiple plots, most of the information collected mainly concerns the “plot
1”. However, to avoid the loss of data available for all the plots cultivated by each household,
we aggregated all the data about both input and output across plots.
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and who manages the plots output. In detail, we create three measures of plot
managing (they are all dummies), one complementary to the other ones, even
though the empirical analysis has been carried out using the one we consider
the most explaining (land management, as already explained) :
• gender land ownership: it is the basic index of land titling, which assumes
the value of 1 whether land is owned by the female head or spouse, and 0
for their male counterparts;
• gender land ownership and use: in this case, always diversifying by men
and women, we attribute the value of 1 to all the land in which women
exert not only a property right, but where they have the right to use it.
This is a fundamental assumption, particularly in contexts where the land
entitlement is not automatically associated to the asset use, and this is
especially evident for women;
• gender land ownership, use and output management : this variable is de-
rived by the integration of the plots output management with the own-
ership and use of plots. In fact, we consider that land ownership itself
and land use may not be sufficient conditions in explaining the gender
differences in agricultural productivity. In effect, since women are often
excluded from the agricultural production management and from its sell-
ing, we assume that the attendance in the output management might
explain possible gender gaps in the agricultural productivity6. For the
explained reasons, the empirical model has been implemented using the
gender of the plot manager. In detail, we create a binary variable, taken
the value of 1 if household plots are owned by female head or spouses,
they have the right to access and use them, and the right to manage the
agricultural output, and 0 for men. Farther, differently from the existing
empirical studies on this field, that use only the sex of the household head
6However, we control for possible differences between landowners and plot managers by
gender, finding that in most of the households landowners at the same time manage the
output.
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as a gender indicator (mainly because gender-disaggregated data on ac-
cess and use or ownership of the plots are often recorded at the household
level, and the household head is often the respondent of the question-
naire), we extended our analysis to both the household head and his/her
spouse. This is a relevant issue, even because restricting the analysis to
the household head might be narrow: in countries such as Uganda, indeed,
most of the households are headed by men, so that many women would
be excluded and gender bias in productivity might be overestimated.
However, to avoid possible biases deriving from the overlapping in the
land management between the head of the household and his/her spouse,
we control for the cases of “mixed land management”. We find that few
plots are managed by both of them simultaneously, but we get rid of them
in order to not distort the final results.
3.1. Empirical specification
Following the existing literature on this field, the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion funtion is used by taking the logarithms on both sides of the equation,
as drawn below:
ln Yij = α0 + α1TGj + β lnIj + τ lnLj + γSj + σHi +  (1)
where Yij is the logged value of total crops produced (per acre) in the
jth plots managed by the ith male or female land manager, T is the land
manager of plots j, differentiated by gender, I is the log of the quantity
of inputs used (expressed in kilograms), namely organic and inorganic
fertilizers, and pesticides, per acre of plots, L is labour input (family and
hired, measured in person days)7, S is a vector of land characteristics
(soil type and quality, topography and water sources), indexed by the jth
7Following Tiberti and Tiberti (2015), due to the presence of zero values in all the inputs
data, we computed the logarithmic form by adding one to all the original values, to then
transform them.
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plots8, and  is the error term.
As the related literature shows, some problems of endogeneity in inputs
choice may arise, so that instrumental analysis may be required, though in
this specific case we do not adopt any instrumental variable methodology.
It is important to bear in mind that we are estimating a measure of partial
differences in gender productivity (as Quisumbing, 1995, suggests), as a
thorough analysis requires specific data on crops grown by women, as
well as inputs access and their use disaggregated by gender, that are not
available in this survey9. Usually, the Cobb-Douglas production function
is estimated by an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. However, in this
specific case, the productivity measure contains a consistent number of
zero values, which may occur for different reasons. For example, the plots
could have been cultivated, but not harvested yet at the time of the visit.
Alternatively, the cultivated crops could have been lost due to adverse
whether shocks, pests or other natural disasters10. Moreover, the area
could have been left fallow to improve soil quality11, or used as pasture or
grazing land, or abandoned due to economic inability to cultivate it (e.g.
high cost of inputs)(Peterman et al., 2011). For these reasons, rather than
dropping plots for which zero productivity is observed, the panel censored
regression model has been implemented, as it may be the most suitable
econometric procedure given the left censoring of the dependent variable
at zero (Tobin, 1958; Honore´, 1992).
The model we estimate is therefore the following:
ln Y ∗ij = land managementij + β Xij + αi + it (2)
8The plot characteristics indices are in a binary form, to make their interpretation more
straightforward, as the questionnaire codes each of them in a categorical form.
9Eventually, we could have extrapolated these information on the basis of the plot man-
ager. However, we implemented the model also separately for male and female plot managers,
but many of the control variables were dropped once the model was run.
10An explicit question was asked to households about the quantity lost, but it refers to the
unit of crops already harvested.
11At this regard, we introduce a binary index for fallow plot as a control variable. Results
are reported in Appendix.
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ln Yi = Y
∗
i if Y
∗
ij > 0
ln Yi = 0 if Y
∗
ij ≤ 0
i = 1, ..., N and it ∼ (0, σ2)
where i and j are the indices for individuals and plots respectively, Y is
the indicator of the plots-level productivity, Y ∗ is the latent dependent
variable, that is equal to the observed Y if Y ∗ is higher than zero, land
management is the plot management indicator, differentiated by gender,
X is the vector of household and plot characteristics, αi is the individual
effect, and it is the error term, assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) as a Normal distribution, with zero mean and fixed
variance, and N is the number of observations (Ai et al., 2015; Peterman
et al., 2011; Gourieroux, 2000; Maddala, 1987). When considering a model
with panel data, the error term it can be decomposed into:
it = αi + λt + uit (3)
where αi is the individual effect (representing all the unobservable char-
acteristics specific to the unit i, assumed constant over time), λt is the
time effect (indicating all the unobservable characteristics of time period
t, constant for all the cross-sectional units in the sample), and uit is a ran-
dom term that varies over time and individuals (Calzolari et al., 2001).
However, Tobit is a random-effects model, that does not control for the
unobserved heterogeneity. For this reason we implemented a Tobit model
with fixed effects (Honore´, 1992), although for robustness check we report
results from the random-effects model in Appendix.
4. DATA
In this study data available are from the First and Second Uganda Na-
tional Household Survey (2009-10 and 2010-11), collected by the Uganda
Bureau of Statistics (UBOS, henceforth), with the support of the World
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Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys -Integrated Survey on Agri-
culture (LSMS-ISA) program12. The survey is conducted annually on a
nationally representative sample of households, which are visited twice
over the year, separately for the dry and rainy seasons, in order to bet-
ter capture seasonal information about consumption and agricultural out-
comes13. For the purposes of the research, we integrated some sections of
the household questionnaire, in which data at the individual level about
the socio-demographics and economic characteristics of the household were
contained, with the agricultural one, that has been administered only to
households engaged in the agricultural sector. Through this merging we
obtained a panel sample of 3.254 households. As in most agricultural sur-
veys, data are collected at the household level. However, the LSMS-ISA
includes information both at the plot and parcel level, regarding both in-
puts and outputs. During each interview, in fact, each household who held
a plot of land was asked to report information on quantities cultivated and
harvested, crops sold or own consumed. All the quantities of output are
recorded in local units and subsequently converted in kilograms. Further-
more, indication about the size of each plot, its manager and owner, the
handler of the output, the use of labour and non-labour inputs, as well
as on the ownership of livestock have been collected. The survey also
contains information on family and hired labour, which are measured in
time units14. In detail, households have been visited twice, during the first
(January-June) and second cropping season (July-December). However,
as for plots and crops, we aggregate data across the two seasons.
12For more details, see the Uganda National Panel Surveys, Basic information document,
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/.
13In principle, the questionnaire has to be answered by the household head or, in his/her
absence, by an adult member of the household. However, in our sample is mainly the household
head who provide the requested information.
14Specifically, the questionnaire records the number of household members working on the
plot, and the days spent on it by both household members and hired labourers where they
are used. Hiring days are recorded for men, women and children. For homogeneity reasons
with hired labour, we focus on the days of work, using them as time measures.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by gender of the plot manager.
Descriptive statistics by gender of the plot manager.
Male-managed plot Female-managed plot
Outcome variable
Value of total productivity (KG/acres) in Shillings (log) 9.49 7.96
Plot manager characteristics
Only landowner 0.726 0.274
Landowner and manager overlap 0.73 0.27
Age of the Household Head (years) 47.3 54
Level of education of the Household Head
No education
Primary education 0.81 0.58
Secondary education 0.07 0.05
Higher education 0.009 0.007
Household characteristics
Household size 7.20 5.91
Number of female children (0-5) 1.03 1.03
Number of male children (0-5) 1.04 1.03
Number of female adults 1.60 1.81
Number of male adults 1.78 1.70
Region of residence
Northern 0.25 0.27
Western 0.26 0.22
Eastern 0.29 0.27
Plot characteristics
GPS-based plot size (acres) 5.07 3.85
Plot ownership status
Only male owner 0.73
Only female owner 0.27
Mixed ownership 0.02
Land tenure
Customary 0.73 0.27
Freehold 0.72 0.28
Mailo a 0.69 0.31
Location
Hilly 0.15 0.13
Flat 0.6 0.55
Gentle slope 0.54 0.56
Steep slope 0.06 0.04
Valley 0.06 0.06
Agro-ecological zones
Savannah .04 .06
Arid and semi-arid 0.1 0.12
Highlands 0.09 0.08
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) b 1.99 2.01
Soil quality
Good 0.75 0.69
Fair 0.47 0.50
Poor 0.11 0.09
Plot cultivation
Intercropped 0.44 0.43
Monocrop 0.29 0.32
Water source
Irrigated 0.03 0.03
Rainfed 0.97 0.97
Swamp 0.05 0.05
Labour inputs (in time units)c
Family labour 84.08 75.9
Men hired labour 2.84 2.59
Female hired labour 5.02 5.29
Children hired labour 7.53 7.33
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 131.52 42.12
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.72 0.13
Pesticide (kg(acres) 0.11 0.10
Improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.85 0.79
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.16 0.9
Number of observations 2226 816
Source: Author’s calculation from Uganda LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
aNote the total number of households who manage land under mailo regime are only 116.
bIn the questionnaire minutes are recorded approximately , reporting a value according to the time
distance from the homestead (1“Less than 15 mn”; 2 “15mn-30mn”; 3 “30 mn-60mn”; 4 “1hour-2
hours”; 5 “Over 2 hours”).
cAs already explained, the notion “time units” refers to the days of work.
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The descriptive statistics differentiated by the gender of the plot manager are
presented in Table 2. They clearly confirm the existence of a gender gap: in fact
the value of output per acre, our measure of productivity, is lower in female-
managed plots respective to the male one. Moreover, the size of plots managed
by women is, on average, smaller than the plots managed by men. Additionally,
in most of the households land is owned by men (73% vs. 27%). In comparison,
male-managed plots make use of a higher share of inputs (both labour and
non-labour): specifically, the quantity (in KGs/acre) of both the organic and
chemical fertilizers is particularly high in male plots, although the difference
in the use of pesticides between male and female-managed plots is very low.
Similarly, we found that the average days spent by female hired labour is slightly
higher in female plots, although in general the amount of both family and hired
labour by gender of the manager is very similar. Lastly, concerning the plot
topography and soil quality, no substancial differences can be observed.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We have estimated the model using the Honore´-fixed effects pantob routine
in Stata 1315. For robustness check, we have also estimated the Tobit model
with random effects for all the model specifications, reporting results in the
Appendix. Table 3 presents the plots regression results at the household level
of the logarithm of productivity of all crops harvested by the households. We
have used as a gender indicator of land the variable “plot manager” rather than
the landowner only, for the reasons already explained. Finally, while in the
paper we have considered the value of the total output harvested, we also run
the model considering the major food crops separately (namely, matooke, beans
and maize). We do not report the results for “cassava” and “potatoes” since
the model did not converge (and, if it did, some of the explanatory variables of
interest were dropped.).
15It is a Gauss program that estimates a censored Tobit model with panel data. The
program is available at http://www.princeton.edu/ honore/stata/.
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Table 3: Panel Tobit with fixed-effects of the value of productivity
of all the crops.
Fixed effects
Gender of the plot manager -9.1*** (2.45)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -4.05*(2.4)
Age of the household head squared (years) 0.03 (0.02)
{Level of education of the Household Head}
Primary education -0.12 (2.1)
Secondary education -3.59 (4.25)
Household size (log) -variable dropped by the pantob estimator
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) -0.46 (0.31)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -3.17 (2.47)
Soil quality
Good 1.003 (1.06)
Fair -0.87 (0.68)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour 0.15 (0.66)
Men hired labour -0.55 (1.19)
Female hired labour -0.18 (1.2)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.29 (0.23)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.07 (0.53)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 1.68* (0.94)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes,0 otherwise) 3.13*** (1.05)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes,0 otherwise) 1.74 (1.19)
Agri-ecological zone
Arid/Semi-arid -2.91 (3.77)
Highlands 3.44** (1.67)
Number of observations 1628
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
As can be seen, plot managed by women are significantly associated with
lower productivity. Including the impact deriving from the use of inputs (both
labour and other than labour) did not reveal any difference between male and
female-managed plots in the household-fixed effects model, with the exception
of pesticides, whose use seems to be positively related to the value of produc-
tivity of all the crops harvested in female-managed plots. Another important
finding concerns the use of improved seeds, which is positively correlated to
crop production. The analysis of agricultural productivity cannot ignore the
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role of agro-ecological zones (AEZ, henceforth). According to FAO, Uganda
can be divided into seven AEZ, with similar ecological conditions (soil type,
topography, rainfall), farming systems and practices. Even so, following Wasige
(2009), and due to the availability of data, we divided Uganda into three broad
agro-ecological zones: savannah, arid/semi-arid and highlands 16. Therefore,
we introduce the regional ecological area as another control variable. Neverthe-
less, we do not insert the plot topography as a control, as already contained on
the agro-ecological zone as explanatory variable. As can be observed, for plots
located in the highlands the total value of crop production seems to be higher
for plots managed by female farmers. The variable “household size” has been
dropped once the model run17. However, when assessing the gender gap in agri-
cultural productivity, we assume that considering the allocation of time devoted
to domestic tasks would be necessary for a wide explanation, as women spend
more time than men in domestic activities. For this reason, the average domes-
tic hours spent by male and female head and spouse have been introduced in
the model. This variable has been extracted from the household questionnaire,
where labour time information at individual level have been collected. Anyway,
we run the model adding further controls, such as the modality of land acqui-
sition, besides the domestic annual hours (disaggregated by gender)18. Results
are reported in Table 4 below19
16For more details, see Wasige, 2009, p.7.
17This may be due to the proximity of the two panel waves, so that the household size may
not change from year to year, not allowing the model to “capture” the differences.
18Agri-ecological zones has not been inserted in this specification, as most of the explana-
tory variables dropped. Contrariwise, we add the topography of plots as control variable.
19In the present table, the topography of the plot is controlled through the variable plot
topography. For this reason the agri-ecological zones have not been inserted.
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Table 4: Panel Tobit with fixed-effects of the value of productivity of
all the crops, with modality of land acquisition and annual domestic
hours of work as further control variables.
Fixed effects
Gender of the plot manager -8.07** (4.04)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -3.18(3.41)
Age of the household head squared (years) -0.01(0.04)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education -0.56(4.26)
Secondary education -0.24 (7.77)
Household size (log) - variable dropped by the pantob estimator
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) 0.39 (0.43)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -1.89 (3.19)
Soil quality
Good -0.17 (1.39)
Fair -1.24 (0.93)
Topography
Hilly 1.89 (1.37)
Flat 0.3 (1.47)
Valley 1.34 (1.28)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour -0.61 (0.99)
Men hired labour -0.08 (2.61)
Female hired labour -2.53 (2.19)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.41* (0.23)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.04 (0.68)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 3.48** (1.43)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 3.07* (1.63)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 3.14* (1.64)
Modality of land acquistion
Male land inherited -1.29 (1.40)
Female land inherited 1.17 (2.76)
Domestic time (log of annual hours)
Men 0.33 (0.22)
Women 0.37**(0.17)
Number of observations 839
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **,* significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
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Firstly, we can observe how the total number of observation reduces dra-
matically. Notwithstanding, these results confirm the lower value of output
associated to female plot-managed. As concerns the way through which land
is acquired, the coefficients are not statistically influential on the productivity,
neither for both men nor for women. Surprisingly, time devoted to domestic
tasks seems controversial: in fact, the model shows off a positive sign for female
domestic time. A possible explanation might be that in this model the variable
is a proxy of domestic time, that includes milling, fetching firewood and col-
lecting water, activities that may be strictly related to the agricultural tasks.
Moreover, differently from the basic model, in this specification the livestock
ownership is associated to a raise in crop production, that may be linked to the
importance of livestock use, such as cows, as agricultural inputs.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we aim to contribute to the growing literature on gender gaps
in agricultural productivity. Notwithstanding the usual data limitations en-
countered in gender analyses, our study adds to the literature, introducing the
new perspective of plots managed by men and women. In fact, given the limits
that this strand of research faces, due to the lack of gender disaggregated data
about land ownership and management, we have been able to build a gender
indicator of plot management, thanks to the household section of the Living
Standard Measurement Survey - Integrated Survey on Agriculture (2009-10 and
2010-11) for Uganda. We find that plots managed by women seem to be less
productive than plots run by men. Also considering for the way by which land
is acquired, as well as for hours spent in domestic tasks, female managed-plots
seem to be less productive than plots managed by men. Unfortunately, data
about the access to and the use of inputs are at household level, so that we
have not been able to properly identify the actual reasons of the lower value of
crop productivity we have found in female-managed plots. In any case, beyond
the limits relating the data features, another important aspect that could affect
our results, but that we did not take into consideration due to the low number
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of data, is the accessibility to extension services, from which women are often
excluded. In sum the generalisability of these results is subject to certain limi-
tations. For instance, because of the lack of gender differentiated data on crops
grown by women and men respectively, the measure of productivity we have
computed is only a partial indicator of the gender bias in productivity. Our
results imply that, since land titling and land management are not sufficient
conditions to fully disclose women’s contribution to agricultural production, in-
creasing women’s access to inputs and to the market for selling the grown crops
might represent an important avenue towards women’s empowerment.
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APPENDIX A
Table 5: Tobit with random-effects of the value of productivity of
all the crops.
Random effects
Gender of the plot manager -2.21* (0.76)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -0.005 (0.14)
Age of the household head squared (years) -0.001 (0.001)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education -0.55 (0.89)
Secondary education -1.76 (1.42)
Household size (log) -1.36* (0.76)
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) 0.11 (0.26)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -2.05 (2.14)
Soil quality
Good 3.28*** (0.73)
Fair 0.9 (0.86)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour 1.27*** (0.45)
Men hired labour -0.47 (1.07)
Female hired labour 1.26 (1.03)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.58 (0.19)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.24 (0.99)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 2.35** (1.2)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.31* (0.75)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.44 (0.91)
Agri-ecological zones
Arid/Semi-arid -4.36*** (1.16)
Highlands 1.23 (1.01)
Constant 1.35 (4.06)
sigma u 5.51*** (0.5)
sigma e 9.04*** (0.31)
rho 0.27 (0.04)
Number of observations 1628
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
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Table 6: Panel Tobit with random-effects of the value of produc-
tivity of all the crops, with modality of land acquisition and annual
domestic hours of work as further control variables.
Random effects
Gender of the plot manager -4.29* (2.43)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) 0.56 (0.4)
Age of the household head squared (years) -0.01* (0.004)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education 0.39 (1.44)
Secondary education -2.68 (2.06)
Household size (log) -2.57** (1.17)
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) 0.12 (0.37)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -1.56 (2.8)
Soil quality
Good 1.96** (0.99)
Fair 0.35 (0.86)
Topography
Hilly 3.81*** (1.13)
Flat 0.16 (0.83)
Valley 3.61** (1.59)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour 2.3*** (0.69)
Men hired labour -0.24 (1.7)
Female hired labour -1.3 (1.77)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.12 (0.31)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) 1.51 (1.51)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 3.16** (1.54)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.55 (0.99)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 5.68*** (1.29)
Modality of land acquisition
Male land inherited -1.57* (0.85)
Female land inherited 2.31 (2.47)
Domestic time (log of annual hours)
Men 0.10 (0.18)
Women -0.27* (0.16)
Constant -10.44 (8.99)
sigma u 4.09*** (0.87)
sigma e 9.34*** (0.45)
rho 0.16 (0.07)
Number of observations 839
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errord into brackets.
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Table 7: Panel Tobit with fixed-effects of the value of productivity
of matooke, maize and beans.
Matooke Maize Beans
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Gender of the plot manager -9.41*** (2.72) 5.99 (10.37) 2.23 (4.17)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -5.18*** (2.10) -10.68** (5.08) 2.27*** (1.14)
Age of the household head squared (years 0.02 (0.02) 0.07 (0.05) -0.04 (0.02)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education 3.50 (3.49) -1.65 (6.08) -9.83*** (3.59)
Secondary education -2.36 (4.15) -6.47 (16.81) -12.39 (10.28)
Household size (log) - -88.73*** (29.64) -
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) 0.13 (0.49) -2.25** (0.98) 0.66 (0.68)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -4.32 (2.82) 5.78 (6.30) 4.67 (4.49)
Soil quality
Good 0.55 (1.71) 4.8* (2.67) 1.36 (1.91)
Fair -1.36 (1.12) 1.8 (2.36) -0.68 (1.49)
Topography
Hilly 2.05* (1.12) 2.58 (3.56) 3.22* (1.7)
Flat 0.19 (1.15) 2.51 (3.13) 0.12 (1.61)
Valley -1.44 (1.53) 5.63 (6.02) 3.83 (2.75)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour 0.98 (1.06) 1.59 (1.45) 4.27*** (1.32)
Men hired labour 0.87 (1.46) -3.56 (4.97) -7.82*** (2.13)
Female hired labour 0.26 (2.15) -3.57 (4.20) -4.46 (3.35)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.17 (0.19) -1.46 (1.09) -0.58 (0.35)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) -1.03 (0.67) -8.78 (8.54) -0.04 (1.25)
Pesticide (kg/acres) 0.38 (1.27) 2.1 (2.94) -3.19 (2.13)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -1.95 (1.95) 9.43*** (2.78) 5.61*** (2.1)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -1.89 (1.98) -0.52 (3.38) 2.86 (2.96)
Number of observations 1736 2020 1950
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
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Table 8: Panel Tobit with random-effects of the value of productivity
for matooke, maize and beans.
Matooke Maize Beans
Random effects Random effects Random effects
Gender of the plot manager -0.79 (1.37) -3.4 (2.61) -0.49 (1.56)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -0.18 (0.25) -0.24 (0.49) 0.23 (0.3)
Age of the household head squared (years 0.002 (0.002) -0.01 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education 1.55 (1.55) 1.25 (3.01) -2.0 (1.77)
Secondary education 2.16 (2.54) 1.11 (4.82) -2.99 (2.98)
Household size (log) -0.27 (1.35) -1.89 (2.47) -1.54 (1.56)
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) -0.40 (0.48) 0.32 (0.88) 1.58*** (0.54)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) 0.28 (3.55) -3.83 (7.22) 8.45** (4.03)
Soil quality
Good 2.23 (1.29) 6.57*** (2.43) 5.39*** (2.67)
Fair -1.13 (1.05) 1.26 (2.07) 1.81 (1.29)
Topography
Hilly 6.31*** (1.2) -1.90 (2.96) 7.79*** (1.58)
Flat -3.54*** (1.00) 7.12*** (2.05) 0.53 (1.25)
Valley 1.33 (1.75) -0.64 (3.94) 2.56 (2.19)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour -0.33 (0.78) 5.75*** (1.45) 4.21*** (1.32)
Men hired labour -0.62 (1.67) 0.80 (3.45) -1.55 (2.22)
Female hired labour 4.11*** (1.60) -1.68 (3.33) -0.13 (2.12)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 1.79*** (0.25) -3.10*** (0.93) 0.63* (0.37)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.24 (1.58) -3.25 (3.99) 1.21 (1.93)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 1.51 (1.86) 1.95 (3.91) 0.37 (2.16)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -1.52 (1.49) 11.14*** (2.36) 5.50*** (1.53)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.94 (1.51) 2.97 (3.01) 3,27* (1.91)
Constant -15.52** (7.25) -45.83*** (13.55) -45.95*** (8.87)
sigma u 11.55*** (0.81) 19.45*** (1.71) 10.86*** (1.1)
sigma e 9.32*** (0.58) 21.96*** (1.33) 13.95*** (0.86)
rho 0.61 (0.05) 0.44 (0.06) 0.38 (0.06)
Number of observations 1736 2020 1950
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
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Table 9: Panel Tobit with fixed-effects of the value of productivity
of all the crops, with fallow as a further control variable.
Fixed effects
Gender of the plot manager -8.51*** (2.4)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -4.03** (1.98)
Age of the household head squared (years 0.002 (0.02)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education -0.95 (2.11)
Secondary education -1.62 (3.92)
Household size (log) 31.86*** (9.37)
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) -0.40 (0.48)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) 0.83 (0.97)
Soil quality
Good 0.83 (0.97)
Fair -0.78 (0.65)
Topography
Hilly 0.69 (0.77)
Flat 0.87 (0.78)
Valley 0.26 (1.004)
Labour inputs (log of time units)
Family labour 0.42 (0.59)
Men hired labour 0.58 (1.11)
Female hired labour -0.65 (1.2)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.24 (0.18)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) -0.05 (0.44)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 0.86 (1.13)
Use of improved seeds (index per plot) 2.86*** (0.97)
Livestock ownership 1.10 (1.12)
Fallow 0.95 (0.8)
Number of observations 2060
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errord into brackets.
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Table 10: Panel Tobit with random-effects of the value of produc-
tivity of all the crops, with fallow as a further control variable.
Random effects
Gender of the plot manager -1.3* (0.67)
Household characteristics
Age of the household head (years) -0.08 (0.12)
Age of the household head squared (years 0.001 (0.001)
Level of education of the Household Head
Primary education -0.08 (0.76)
Secondary education -1.48 (1.28)
Household size (log) -1.47** (0.65)
Plot characteristics
Location
Distance from the homestead (index of minutes) 0.16 (0.24)
Water source
Irrigated land (log) -1.63 (1.93)
Soil quality
Good 3.1*** (0.65)
Fair 0.52 (0.56)
Topography
Hilly 3.31*** (0.72)
Flat -0.08 (0.53)
Valley 2.78 (1.003)
Labour inputs use (log of time units)
Family labour 1.52*** (0.40)
Men hired labour 0.58 (0.92)
Female hired labour 0.78 (0.87)
Other inputs (log)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.47*** (0.17)
Chemical fertilizer (kg/acres) 0.58 (0.99)
Pesticide (kg(acres) 2.27** (1.05)
Use of improved seeds (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.41** (0.70)
Livestock ownership (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 2.26 (0.79)
Fallow -1.20* (0.63)
Constant -0.02 (3.57)
sigma u 5.45*** (0.46)
sigma e 9.13*** (0.28)
rho 0.26 (0.04)
Number of observations 2060
Source: Author’s calculation using the LSMS-ISA 2009-10 and 2010-11.
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Standard errors into brackets.
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CONCLUSION
This PhD thesis investigates the sources of women’s empowerment in low-income
countries, namely Nepal and Uganda. More specifically, we seek to assess the
role of land entitlement, food price instability and plot management respectively
in affecting the woman’s condition in rural contexts.
Three main research paths have been followed in the thesis: the first one
has led to the finding that extending land ownership to women employed in
the agricultural sector can increase their decision-making power within the
household, where decisional independence is used as a measure of empowerment.
This finding is confirmed by the evidence stemming from the three estimation
strategies implemented. Even if paid work increases more female decisional
independence, ownership of land is an important source of economic growth
and women’s empowerment.
As a number of studies emphasized, in fact, possessing land is an incentive to
invest on it, with positive implications for agricultural production.
Production is the main focus of the third paper, that investigates whether
agricultural productivity varies with the sex of the plot manager. In line with
previous findings in the literature, we find that plots managed by women are
less productive than those managed by men. However, this may also be related
to reasons we are not able to control for, such as limited access of women to
more productive assets, like fertilizers, machineries, extension services and so
on, on which, unfortunately, gender-disaggregated data are not available.
Finally, in the second paper we contribute to the recent growing research on
the impact of food prices, through a gender analysis on the labour supply side.
This is the other research path we followed in the thesis. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt in this regard, also because generally this
kind of studies does not take into consideration the gender dimension. However,
the results confirm the traditional role of women as “shock absorbers”: in fact,
we found that food price instability has affected more female than male paid
labour work. Many are the possible explanations, but the most relevant is
related to the fact that women have the burden to ensure household members
subsistence, so that changes in food prices may lead them to increase their
market labour time in order to guarantee food security.
In general, we can conclude affirming that findings from the three essays
confirm the idea that women are often excluded at both social and economic
level, with implications for the household well-being and for the economic growth.
In fact, as emphasized by the major part of the related literature, women have a
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crucial role for the subsistence of the household members, particularly children
and the elderly, so that their vulnerability has extendend negative effects. This
vulnerability may be attributed to the multi-tasking characteristics of women,
that is innate, but also related to socio-cultural constructs.
Therefore, despite the growing attention paid by the international community,
and the evidence provided by academic research, gender continues to be a factor
of discrimination.
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